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CHAPrER ONE
... -

The purpose

or

INTRODUCTION

this thesis is an exposition

cerning the free-w1l1 controversy.

An

err art

or

Will.1am James' views con-

will be made to see how the prob-

lem arose for him, the m&rmer in whioh he viewed it, and the way that, after
many years

or

personal difficulty and intellectual struggle, he ultimately re-

solved the problem.

Before beginning these matters, however, a word about the

unity and consistency of James' philosophic views is in order.
James has often been taunted, posthumously, with the accusation that he is
nunsystematic. tt

If by a system of

phnosop~

is meant fitting everything in

the universe into its proper logical.l.y demarcated compartment, James has no system of philosophy.

In fact he would rebel against the thought of such a system,

both in himself' or in others.
ture

or

He hated system, in thill sense, and his own pic-

the world leaves it full of loose ends and uncompleted processes.

He

considered this the only true description of' the wcrld as we find it.
On the other hand, 1£ one means by a system

or

phUosop~

the answering

of a wide varietyof' questions in the light of a ffIW basic principles, then

James is systematic; and, his philosophic views are unified and oonsistent.
James' writings and lestures cover a span of over thirty-tive years, arxi the

un

S'

•

51'

Z'P

7

'2
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12'
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clear example

or

or

this, it is obvious to anyone who has read more than a little

James, that his theory of truth, his views on ethics, hi. radical empiricism,

his cosmology and his philosophy
pragmatic theory

or

meaning.

or

religion, are all based on h18 distinctive

It'is hoped that this thesis will also illustrate

thill same unity and consistency with regard to James' handling

or

the problem

of free will.
Because James' philosophical views were so prof'use and varied, and because
he wrote in the popular style of the lecturer, it is necessary before beginning

to show clearly where the matter of this thesis fits into the complex

pattern of' his thought.

Also, James had a distinctive way of viewing the op-

erations of the human c:rganlsm, and the psychological terms that are
ular concern here,

"will,"

or

partic-

"free-will," "will to believe," and "belief," must

be clearly explained so as to avoid confusion; however, this can be done in
the proper place in following chapters.

".

The best way to situate the particular

problem of this thesis is to show briefly the sweep of the thought here as it
progresses through this and succeeding chapters.
In the following ohapter the concern is with James' general philosophical.

approach to lit e.

We will show what he understands philosophy to be, and how

this understanding

or

his clearly illustrates the stance that he takes in grap-

pling with the problems to come.

It is part of' the thesis

or

this chapter

that James' personal. psychological make-up has a lot to do with his view
life and, therefore, with his philosophy.

Just as hil!l personal. make-up can

tell us something about his advocacy of' pluralism over monism,
theoryof' 'truth over correspondence theory,

or

or

or

pragmatic

his affinity far meliorism and

.n_........__.......=.r...._______

........_ - - -• •,
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radical empiricism, of his need for novelty, so al80 it should be helpful in
giving us an insight into his resolution
troversy.

or

the freedom vs. determinism con-

In presenting James' general philosophical approach, the follOWing

chapter must show how James arrived at his particular application of philosophiY,
its meaning to him, aDd in what it consists in terms
"system."

or

the key aspects

or

hia

Something also should be said about his complementary theories of

meaning; Paul Henle has aptly termed them the

II

tough-minded" and tender-minded"

'.

I

strains of James' pragmatic method. l
It is the purpose

or

our third chapter to study at length William James'

scientific will-theory as set forth in his classic PrinCiples

~ Psycholo~.

With the general theory exposed as a proper context, we will consider as one
part

or

that will-theory James' study of the problem

or

,
,i

free-will; we will note

the way that he considered the problem, the alternatives he set himself along
with his resolution of those conflicting alternatives, and the consistancy and
excellence

or

his answer to the problem.

\

James ends his long study there with the admission that the problem can
have

~

answer on the level of empirical. psychologyJ tor, the bare data cannot

point to freedom or determiniam as a universal tact. Rather, the data must be
discussed. and interpreted, and James aftirms strongly in the preface that this

.'

~i

is philosophy and should have no place in a scientific study of the principles
of psychology.

Thus, we see that the problem

or

free will is a specifically'

philosophical. problem, and we must look elsewhere.J,n James' writings for his

.'
I

;'

lCf. his introduction to the James selections in Max H. Fisch (editor),
Classic American Philosophers! Peirce, James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead, New York, 19)1, pp. 115-127.

_ . . .-.-Il0l11----------'.'...'., _. . . ._'_,__..'. ".11.'_,••
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4
formal answer.
The fourth chapter, therefore, returns to philosophy as James viewed it.
However, here the general philosophical. approach as set t orth and explained in
the second chapter is now applied to the particular problem of this thesis.
The nwill to believe" doctrine, a particular example of James' general philosophic outlook is first explained.

It is then applied, as his "tender-minded"

pragmatic theory of meaning, to the even more particular freedom vs. determinism controversy.

The result is the tamous "Dilemma

or

Determinism" argument

of The Will to Believe. 2
---~.....;---

Supplementary arguments for J&1Ies' moral option for freedom and the gospel
of effort must be considered.

Pragmatism,) Essays

Finally, his later views, briefly expressed in

!!: Radical

Empiricism,4 and ~ Problems ~ PhilosoPhy,5

will be studied and related to the central arguments given in

~ ~

to

~-

lieve.
With the study of the appendix

or

~

Problems

!!£ Philosophy,

the last

bit that James wrote on our problem--this posthumously published Tolume James
called his most metaphyaical wark--1t is hoped that a systematic and clear expos1 tion of William James' views concerning the tree-will contrOTeray will have
been concluded.

2The Will to Believe, and other Essay!
1897, chap~fIVe.
)Pragmatism:

~~ ~

!2!

!!!

Some Old Ways

~ew York, 19l2.
5Some Problems .2f. PhilosophY's ! Beginning
New York, 1911.

Popular Philosophy, New York,

.2!: Thinking,

New York, lti99.

of !!l Introduction to Phi1osC'_

I

-

Ot

.

•
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The final chapter

or

this thesis will contine itself to remarks and some

observations on James' views and treatment
making them more mean1ngtul or

or

or

this problem, with the hope

or

pointing up some inconsistencies in his

thought, if there be any-.
With these few introductory notes understood, let us begin our consideration of James' general philosophic approach to life.

-

'm

$

CHAPrm TWO

JAMES' PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW (E LIFEI

"

THE CIRCUMSTANCES

NECESSARY FOR SATISFYING A PERSONAL NEED

Perhaps the first thing that one must note in stating any or William James t
philosophical views is that they are primarily and. always from the standpoint
of the subject.

Any other approach to the intellectual life was for him preten-

tiousness. What James could not tolerate was "scientism," the uncritica.1 devotion to scientific objectivity in
disinterestedness.

!!! matters,

under the pretext of personal

He spends practically all of the

to explode the notion that what goes under the name
approach to the fundamental issues

or

~

or

to Believe striving

science or a rational

human existence is ipso facto any more

authentic or encompassing than rival points

or view. l

In fact, he suggests

that beiDg scientific in the sense of basing one's outlook on the hypotheses

or

science is just one approach to lite, and that so far as certain questions are
concerned a most inadequate approach.
Where an impersonal. view is called for, where we are not required to take
a stand but merely secure lithe tacta,. where we are prepared to de!ine objectivity as the

minimum

participation

or

the individual in the resulte

or

his deUb-

erations--working a problem in integral caJ.culus, computing the force of elec-

lThough only explicitly argued at length in (the essays entitled) "The
Sentiment of Rational! ttl and "The Will to Believe," the thought is a'v 1 dent
throughout the book.
6

-

• srrne

•

rnts

5

.

7'

.

~7'~'fj::,'r."Y.'

or:.~

7
tronic generators ~ determ1niJ'lg an 1mpend1Dg fiscal policy, or studying the etfects of gang warfare on fanily lU'e in New York--there scientific objectivity
justly rules supreme.

Thus, subjectivity for James i8 not a mere indulgence in

personal nostalgia or opposition to technical and scientific advance under the
guise

or

maintaining an elevated tone; rather, it is the acknowledgment

tremendous chasm separating problems

or

or

a

comparatively little import to the in-

ner man from those that mean everything to him, problems that do not permit the
inquirer to forget himself in his inquiries.
Philosophy, for James entails the maximum participation
individual in the results
are always

or

or

or

the inquiring

his deliberations and enquiries, since its results

great import to the inner man.

There!' ore, philosophy is necessar

ill" "subjectivistic," (i.e., from the standpoint

or

the subject.)

The philo-

sophical answers that we seek to personal problems are never ready-given throug
calculation or "objective analysis of the nature

or

things."

To seek such an-

ewers is to pursue a false hope, for, philosophical enquiry intimately entail.s
the philosopher, and the only answers one gets, gradually disclose themselves
through personal choice.
James expressed these views repeatedly. For example, in an address delivered in 1891 premonitions or his distinctive contribution to the theory of
pragmatism are evident as he analyzes and emphasizes the need for subjective
accompaniment to this common-sense philosophy of his:
I ought to give a message with a practical outcome and an emotional
musical accompaniment, so to speak, fitted to interest men as men,
and yet also not altogether to disappoint the philosopher--since philosophers, let them be as queer as they will, still are men in the

...
_ ................- - - - - - - - -. . . . . .
- - - - -••- - - - - - - - - - - - -...,.:_hJfh1&~

--1;,."'-).

8
secret recesses of their hearts, even here at Berkeley.2
Or, note that his denial

or

the possibility

or

an objective philosophy

could give the casual reader the impression that he was against all scientific
endeavor, which was certainly

~

the case.

• • • what accounts do the nethermost bounds or the universe owe to me?
By what insatiate conceit and lust of intellectual despotism do I arrogate
to myself the right to know their secrets, and from my philosophic tm-one
to play the only airs they shall march to, as i f I were the Lord I s anointed?)
In tact, in some instances subjectivity alone will allow one to get at and make
one's own philosophic universel
But in every LPhilosophiS! tact into which there enters an element or
personal contribution on my part, as soon as this personal contribution
demands a certain degree of subjective energy which, in its turn, calls
for a certain amount or faith in its result--so that, after all, the
future fact is conditioned by my present faith in it--how trebly asinine
would it be for me to deny myself the upe .2!:. the subjective method, the
method of belief based on desire • • • :uThe result

or

this is that each manl s philosophy is unavoidably determined by

the kind of man he is, even where from the viewpoint

or

his surroundings or his

age the correspondence might appear paradoxical. S
With James philosophic thought is carried on for the benefit
interests.

All intellectual activity is definitely purposive.

or

specific

Truth is what

it is better to believe, and thus it becomes one species of the goodJ it is
purposive and valuational.

This is not to ignore the tact that James was an

2nphilosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," Collected Essays and
Reviews, New York, 1920, pp. 406-401.
---3nOn Some Hegelisms,"

~ Will

4nThe Sentiment of Rationality,"

!:2

Believe, ,2E. ~., p. 211.

~., p. 91.

Sror example, Plato, Augustine, Kierkegaard, Newman.
,'"

N'

norn t v .

.'

:

'S

.

m

9
eminent scientist and that the "will to believe" was

alw~s

a

~

resort in

settling problema. Rather, it is to call to our attention the fact that for
James the really important questions in life--and one' a answers to these are
what give one's philosophy its distinctive character--are all beyond science,
and that the individual's way

or

viewing life are

!!! ~

he

~

for answering

these questions.
If the philosophy is to be determined by the character

question must then arise I
The bare facts

or

What kind

or

or

the man, the

man was William James?

his early lite are significant and easily told.

born in New York City on January 11, 1842.

He was

His father, Henry James, Sr.,

famous in his day for his writing and lecturing abilities, had his own ideas
about the education of his children, and they attended several schools both in
the Un! ted States and abroad.
years

or

Most

or

the period from thirteen to eighteen

age William was at school abroad, and there undoubtedl.7 acquired the

cosmopolitan touch that remained with him all his lite.
Young James went through a period when he thought he was to be a painter J
but a.f."ter a year's serious effort decided he could not excel in this field.

1861 he entered the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard.

In 1864 the family

moved to Boston, and William entered the Harvard Medical School.
he accompanied Louis Agassiz on an expedition up the Amazon River.

In 1865-1866

The years

1867 and 1868 were spent mainly studying in Europe, aIXl in 1869 he received
his M.D. from Harvard.
Though the events
hardly the full storY

In

or these later years are easily recounted, they are
or that period of' James' life. For, begirurlng with his

-

as

m

tn',

$

,

"trr m."' 'w

•

ettftd ".
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adult years

or

study in Europe and progressively throughout the succeeding

yeara, James seemed to be slipping into a desperate neurasthenic condition that
could possibly have become permanent.
an awareness

or

It' a intensity was truly dangerows, and

this fact is necessary for a full realization

this period upon his later li.!'e.
help him in this crisis.

His account

or

the acute attack

or

the Varieties

or

~

clearly illustrates what he went through at this time.

people

or

the impact

or

His friends and family seemed powerless to

scribed in the autobiographical passage
~

or

his day James declined to apeak

or

melancholia de-

Religious ExperiLike most cultured

himself in his published writings,

but recounted this personal experience indirectly as a ttreport from a French
correspondent":
I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some
article that was there; when suddenly there f ell upon me without any
warning, just as i t it came out of the darkness, a horrible fear of rrrsr
own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an
epileptic patient wham I had Been in the asylum, a black-haired youth
wi th greenish akin, entirely indiotic, who used to sit all day on one
or the benches, or rather shelves against the wall, with his knees drawn
up against his chin, and the coarse grey undershirt, which was his only
garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure. He sat there like
a sort or sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing but
his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. This image and my fear
entered into a species or combination with each other. That shape am I,
I felt, potentially. Nothing that I possess can defend 'iiieigainst tlia't
fate, if the hour for it should strike for me, as it struck for him.
There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as i f something hitherto
solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering
fear. After this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke
morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my stomach, am
with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that
I have never felt since.! It was like a revelation; and although the iw~~e
diate feelings passed away, the experience has made me sympathetic with
the morbid feelings of others ever since. It gradually faded, but for
months I was unable to go out into the dark alone.
In general I dreaded to be left alone. I remember wondering how
other people could live, how I myself had ever lived, so unconscious of

,m

rt

t
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11
that pit or insecurity beneath the surface or lite • • • I have always
thought that this experience of melancholia of mine had a religious
bearing.6
.
Along with this neurasthenia there was an acoompanying spiritual crisis.
An ebbing

or

the will to live for lack of a philosophy to live by, a paralysis

of action for want of a morality, seized him.

question:
evil?

He became obsessed with the

How can action be justified in the face

or

a universe permeated wi til

Perhaps an answer:

But if, as in Homer, a divided universe be a conception possible for
his intellect to rest in, and at the same time he have vigor of liill
enough to look the universal death in the face without blinking, he can
lead the ille of moralism. A mUitant existence, in which the ego is
posit.ed as a monad, 'With the ~ood as its end, and the final consolation
only that or irreconcilable hatred--though evil slay me, she canlt subdue me, or make me worship her. The brute force is all at her command,
but the final protest or ~ soul as she squeezes me out or existence
gives me still in a certain sense the superiority.7
Perhaps the "lite

or

moralism" could resolve this criSis, he thought.

If "vigo

of will" is heroioally asserted, then perhaps one can contront evil, either wit

the hope of conquering it, or at least of dying bravely under its force.

This

was the answer that James faintly perceived; he derived it from Charles
Renouvier, a contemporary French philosopher who later became a correspondent.
and a dear friend.

Its importance in James' lite can hardly be exaggerated,

as can be seen trom this insert in his diary for April 30, 18701

6The Varieties

1903,

We 160-161.

or

Religious Experiences

-

A Study in Human Nature, New York,

--

7Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought ~ Character

1935, vol. I, pp. 322-323.

or William James, Boston,

12

I think that yesterday was a crisis in 'IffY life. I finished the
first part of Renouvier' s second. Essais and see no reason why his
de!inition of free wiU--"the sustaining of a thought because I choose
to when I might have other thoughts"--need not be a correct and meanIiigrul one, rather than the definition of an illusion. At any rate,
I will assume for the presen~--until next year--that it is no illusion.
My first act of free will sb.al.l be to believe in free will. 8
By this simple insight into the possibility of a vigorous life James was

at least able to stop the current of thought and emotion that seemed to be
carrying him on to debility and even mental illness.

His philosophical answer

to this spiritual crisis was by no means a cure, but it

~

~

a turning point.

Fat' several years the road was hard, with only a very gradual incline, but at
least it was leading upward to a more active life.

James' commencement of his

teaching career in l872--to last for 38 years--and his marriage in 1878 to
Alice H. Gibbens no doubt were milestones along that vay.
to all as a remarkable woman) a source

or

Mrs. James was known

personal happiness and stability in

Williaa's career, she 1nf1uenced his personality and. household to an evident
degree.

In addition, the very

~

of the marriage vas a source

or

strength

and steadying purpose f or him.
James' debt to Renouvier was considerable.
!Renouvier in the writings
Divonne on October

or

The first all.usion to Charles

James is in a letter to his father written from

5, 1868. From that time, Perry tells us, he followed Re-

nouvier's writings "with close attention and eager interest."

Correspondence

ibegan in 1872 and continued steadily till Renouvier's death in 1904.
James contributed an article entitled "Quelques considerations

~

In 1818

la methode

subjective" to Renouvier's Critique philosopbique, and thereafter translationS

,

1.3
of James' papers appeared at frequent intel"'lals in that periodical.

1880 James actually taught a course on Renourler at Harvard.
ence

or

In 1879-

Though a d1f'fer ..

twenty-seven years separated them in age, the two men shared ideas as

philosophic equals and relished the differences that separated them.

It cannot

be doubted that "Renouvier's was the greatest individual inrluence upon the
development of James'8 thought," as Perry affirms.

It is also clear to those

who have read both philosophers that it is the voluntaristic and fideistic side
of Renou~er that touched James most deeply.9

the substance

or

Though there were differences,

Renouv1er's thought and spirit can be found in James' own

"Will to Believe" arguments.
Perry emphasizes--and rightly so--two aspects
crisis of 1870:

or

James' victory over the

" ••• first, the fact that he experienced a personal crisis

that could be relieved only by a philosophical insight; and, second, the specli-<
ic quality of the philosophy which bis soul-sickness required. nlO
To begin with the second aspect, namely, the specific quality of phUosop
he needed to combat the sickness.
very begjnn'ing

or

We see that the fact that James from the

bis adult life BUttered an increasing neurasthenic condition,

with an accompanying spiritual crisis, seems clearly to argue that it was a
symptom

or an underlying permanent soul-sickness, that would trouble

him

throughout adult life.
One becomes all the more convinoed

or

this on reading in Perry that Henry

James, Sr., known like his Bon to have been a dynamic and warm personality in

9perry, I, p.

655.

lOrbid., I, p. 323.
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his ;youth, also as an adult went through what might be called today a nervous ,
breakdown because

or

an intense emotional conflict.

when he found a solution pointing the way

a traumatic experience not unlike that
~

Religious

or

He too only came out or'it

to a more vigorous 11te. He records
his son described in the Varieties

~erience:

One day, however, towards the close of ~, having eaten a comfortable dinner, I remained sitting at the table after the family had dispersed, idly gazing at the embers in the grate, thinking of nothing and
feeling only the exhilaration incident to a good digestion, when suddenly-in a lightning flash as it were--"fear came over me, am trembling, which
made all my bones to shake." To all appearances it was a perfectly insane
and abject terror, without ostensible cause, and only to be accounted for,
to my perplexed imagination, by some damned shape squatting invisible to
me within the precincts or the room and raying out from his fetid personality influences fatal to life. The thing had not lasted ten seconds be, fore I felt myself a wreck; that is, reduced from a state of firm, vigorous, joyous manhood to one of almost helpless infancy. • • • This ghastly
condition or mind continued 'With me, with gradually lengthening intervals
of relief, for two years, and even longer. ll
That William James emerged victorious from ~ crisis of 1870 'Would argue
only to the tact that he had turned the tide, not that he had changed his underlying nature.

Thus, in calling attention to the "specific quality of the

philosophy which his soul-sickness required,- Perry is striving to bring home
to us the tact that James' personal approach to philosophy, his subjective
style of thought, is intimately connected

~th

this underlying nature.

In emphasizing the first aspect ot James' victory over the crisis--that
it could be resolved only by a philosophical insight--Perry is letting us in
on the underlying reason tor the subjectivism of James' philosophical views.
tF'or James all philosophic problems, as we have seen, are vital problems.

He

liThe Liter~ Remains !?! the Late Henrr James, edited with an Introdue'tion by-w'illiam ames, BOston, I8E'S, as quoted in Edward C. Moore, Ameriean '
Pra£lTlatisnu Peirce~ J8.I'OO8~ Dewe1l, New York J 1961 t p. 111.

$t
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looks for a solution not merely tenable as judged by scientific standards, but
at the same time meaningtul enough to live by.

It

Philosophy was never, for

James, a detached and di8passionate inquiry into truthJ still less was it a
form of amusement.

It was a quest, the outcome of which was hopefully and fear-

fully apprehended by a soul on trial and awaiting its sentence. n12

Philosophy

thus was never a mere theory for him, but always a set of beliefs which reconciled him to lite.
Let us return now to the specific quality of James' philosophic approach

to life; for, that is our main concern here. First, a word a.bout how he
arrived at it and what it meant to him.
James required a philosoph,. to save him, not just any
suited to his particular ditficu1ty.

philosop~

but one

Yet, he did not sit down of an afternoon

with the propositions of the main currents of Western thought spread out before
him f cr the cold selection of a patch-quilt philosophy.

At first glance his

views might seem to be a patch-quUt. Viewed from within, however, they are a
consistent whole, only arrived at atter years

or

struggling with monism and

pluralism, correspondence and pragmatic truth-values, idealism and empiricism,
a dynamic universe of novelty and. a cantorting, static one.
James honestly and. painfully wcrked at a philosophy that would be true because it meant something to him.

The fact that it resolved a personal 1'1 u~, I

and satisfied an individual concern does not render it worthless for other men.
It merely asserts his own dependence upon it. What fulfilled a

person~J.

need

became meaningful--as James discovered that first year that he gave Renouvier's

12 Perry, I, p. 323.

l
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doctrine the test--and meaningfulness is all that any philosopher asks of a'
system.
Thus, James' therapeutic insight became a "gospel of belie!, a philosophy
of the will to believe."

He was truly "a strong man overcome by weakness."l)

That weakness was resolved in one instance by a simple decision to believe in
free will as leading to action, and to act thereby.

To believe by an act of

the will in the efficacy of will leads to an exercise of that will and to acIf it worked once, it may work again; thus, James tried it f or a li!' e-

tion.
time.

This key to a cure became the center of' an outJ.ook and the core of a philosophy.

It was not consciouSly and coldly decided for; nor was it stumbled

upon and kept because it placed one in a euphoria of optimistic fellow-feeling.
No, this answer to a personal problem worked; it satisfied a personal need that
James felt at the center

or

his personality.

Others obviously have felt this

need for dynamic assertion of one's will to sustain inner life and balance;
perhaps all men unconsciously have this need.

or reality.
thought seems painfully and slowly to have evolved into

therefore, it must be true.
is the way that James'

At any rate, for him it 'WOrked;

It must tell something about all

This

a philosophy over the years after 1870.
Now that we have seen how James arrived at his phUosophy and what it
meant to him, let us look in more detail at the distinctive approach his philos
oplly took after his resolution of the 1870 ,crisis.
aspects?

What were some of its

Can this approach really be seen throughout the many parts of his

__
---~"Mr_ _ _..
__
~ lIIIII.tr_'liIoIIklflllttt_llllliftlllll'IIIIIIM.tt.'•••
'd..·. '.Me........
' . .'. '._ _ _ _ _ _........'.5••, .......c .1 .illldiilillilll.,t.J....
; ....,...;,.·~_""'·..
ffilitilitiiill~~·~·'1~.·(.t>~,~,
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canplex and varied "system"?
Perhaps the clearest statement or JaDeS' distinctive approach to litewu
written in 1878 in a letter to his wire,
I have often thought that the best way to define a man's character would
be to seek out the particular mental or moral attitude in which, when it
came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive.
At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says, "This is
the real me." • • • This characteristic attitude in me always invOlVes an
element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were, and trusting
outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but
without any guaranty that they will. Make it a guaranty -- and the attitude immediately becomes to my consciousness stagnant and stingless. Take
away the guaranty, and I feel (provided I am ~berhaupt in vigorous condition) a sort of deep enthusiastic bliss, of bitter Willingness to do
and suffer anything, which translates itself physically by a kind of sting
ing pain inside my breast-bone (don't smile at this -- it is to me an
essential element of the whole thing~) and which, although it is a mere
mood or emotion to which I can give no form in 'Words, authenticates itself
to me as the dee~st principle of all active and theoretic determination
which I pOBsess. 14
There seems to be almost a physical need for unsureness, for novelty that is
fraught with the danger of failure, for a complicated and unclear series
forces that le.ft alone would probably lead to destruction.

or

This seems strange

till one recalls that this was just the situation at the time that James faced
the crisis or 1870 and survived by an exertion of his will.
If strong vigorous exertion

or

his internal. powers is the cure for a man

afflicted with the tendency to ro1apse into Bome sart

or

cholia, then it seems quite nAtural that thti lilian will

ntlVbr [tltll

netlrA.st.hE""io JI1E"lanbCi.tibt'it:>d un-

less he is encountering the unsure and dangerous circumstances that will continuously call forth from him the healtht"ul exercise of those internal

r orees •

14rhe Letters of l<lilliam James, edited by his son Henry James, New York,
1920, pp. 199-200.
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Once make the sLtuation comfortable and sure, and the man settles into a lethargio state

or

"stagnant and
stingless consciousness."
,

comparable to that

or

The situation seems

building up the proper muscles, by' their strong and vig--

orous exercise, for a man to run the four-minute mile--here, to run the course
of a vigorous life.

Or, better, suppose a man to be dependent for his life

upon the strength and vigor of a particular muscle about his heart, which can
only be sustained by its own peculiar exercise.

A lack of the circumstances

that allow for this exercise will eventually result in the deterioration or

or

atrophy

the specialized muscle, and the man's death.

So also William James possessed an internal power that required exercise

to maintain its strength. The power was his will, the center

or

his full men-

tal life; the circumstances necessary for its exercise were a world fraught
with novelty, unaureness, danger, a pluralistic universe filled with loose ends
and uncompleted processes, the teeming richness and immediate disorder and chaotic novelty of everyday life.

I
I,
\

The immediate effect of the presence of these

circumstances to James was the exercise of his internal powers, particularly
his will to believe.

exercise

or

Remove the circumstances and there is no chance lor the

those powers.

Therefore, those circumstances were as necess&r,1 tor

James' health and happines8 as the ordinary exercise

or

one' e internal

polo/cn.!

and faculties are for any man.
With James, because of his individual. nature and peculiar problems, the
circumstances mentioned above were a peculiar necessity.

Equally as sensitive

and as productive as James, another man may need different ci!"cumstancesj yet, \_:
they are both alike in that they need, and always secure tor themselves, the
view

or

life that will ensure their healthy, energetic living.
,'"

It is part of

i

.....----------------------------...._-----"., ..
I
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the thesis of. this chapter that James needed
and

!!:!!!!!!

internal faculties

"circumstances necessarl"
foundation of

~

~

~

vigorous exercise

maintain health

~

happiness,

!2.!: ~ ~ !E:! way .2!. looking ~

philosophy.

.2!. ~ ~

~ ~ ~

reall ty,

~

Without the philosophy that he arrived at

80

painfully and carefully James could not have exercised his will to believe in
the many things that made life so meaningful to him.

Without the exercise

or

that will and the beliefs he attained by it, James could not have worked hia
way back as he did to a vigorous productive lifeJ he would not have been the
llliam James that will always be lovingly remembered as a man and highly respected as one of the outstanding figures of the classic period of American
philosophy.
Thus it must be said that the "circumstances necessary" emphasized above
were the tenor aid general tone of James' philosophy.

Others may find them-

selves, through the inevitable onrush of ille and events, possessed of
anschauung.

a~

James must work out one ahead of time with which to live, without

which he could not live.

Those "circumstances necessary" were the foundation

of. James' philosophy.

It is a further part

or

the thesis defended here that James could not

mea.n1ngfully have exercised his will, unless he sincerely believed in the freedom

or

the will.

This belief' is only part of the "circumstances" necessary for

the full functioning of that will; it is part of' his philosophy, and yet it ala
seems to be the center of that philosophy.

As a result, there 18 a etrange co-

relationship between what James held concerning the freedom of the will and
other parts of' his philosophy.
James was driven at one time to affirm that the possibility of vOllt~:~al.
,'"

i
1
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attention--we will see in the next chapter that by this he meant free-nil-was the "pivotal question

or

or

metaphysics, the very hinge on which our picture

the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism, monism, toward spiritual-

ism, freedom, pluralism,--or else the other way."lS

Could the centraJ.ity of

freedom in James' thought have anything to do with the fact that he resolved
the crisis

or

1670 by a free decision to believe in free will?

This is a

question that only he could answer. Rather, let us now look at some of the
facets

or

James' philosophical thought and note their interdependence with his

option for free will.
To begin with pluralism--that philosophical outlook that James strongly
defended against all comers, friend or foe alike, till his death--we see that
it can hardly be explained except in terms of free will.
essay, "The Dilemma

i

I

I'

or

James tells us in the

Determinism," that

The only consistent way or representing pluralism and a world whose parts
may affect one another through their conduct being either good or bad is
the indeterministic way. What interest, zest, or excitement can there be
in achieving the right way, unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong
way i~ a possible and natural way -- nay more, a menacing and an imminent
way110

I

And the indeterministic way here means the way

I

tiona are as a matter

or

or

free will, for "future voli-

fact the only ambiguous things we are tempted to be-

I

lieve in."17

Or expressed in terms: of' novelty, which for James is

l'The Principles

or

80

d1stinct-

Psychologz, New York, 1690, vol. I, p. 446.

l6.rhe Will to Believe, ~. cit., p. 175. I am partly indebted for scme or I
the following references to J .S.'BIxier, Religion ~ ~ Philosophy of William '
,James, Boston, 1926, chapter IV.
17 Ibid., p. 177.
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ly a pluralisticconceptiona

pluralism accepts the notion
Radical

empiricism~

"Free will means nothing but real novelty,; so

or

free will. R18

another equally important aspect

or

thought~

James'

offers evidence for freedom, and at the same time finds that the fact of freedom confirms its own postulates. 'Whatever is in experience is real.
is a clear fact of

experience~

felt with a special emphasis.

Volition

and accompanied by effort it makes its presence
"The existence of • • • effort as a phenomenal.

fact in our consciousness cannot, of course, be doubted or denied. H19 Volition
for James means

attention~

and of attention he sayst

"We feel as i f we could

make it really more or less, and as i f our free action in this regard were a
genuine critical point in ~ature.n20 More will be said of attention and will
in our third

chapter~

but it is clear here that radical empiricism. points to

freedom as an indubitable object of experience.
However~

or

relations.

it al.so finds in the

~

of free will evidence tor its own

t~.1

This theory is best eXpressed 1n the statement that tithe rela-

tions between things, conjunctive as well as diljunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more
things themselves.R21

18Some Problems

80

nor less

80,

than the

To support this theory radical. empiricism is quick to

2!.

Philosophy, 2I!. cit., p. 141.

19Principles, vol. II, p.

535.

20ralks to Teachers on Psychology,
Ideals, New York, 1920, p:-191.
2l.rhe Meaning ~ Truth:

And to Stuuents on Some

or

Life's

~ Sequel to Pragmatism, New York, 1932, p.

xii.
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or

seize upon any evidence it can fiM
ly experienced.

i

I

I

I

The experience of change is clearly the experience of' a re-

lation which binds that which went before to that which is coming atter.
James would ask, Where is the fact
ence

or

or

I

II

only in the synthetic activity

AM

change more evident than in the experi-

deciding between two alternatives?

Empiricism (entitled tiThe Experience

,

conjunctive relations which are obvious-

or

In a chapter of Essays in Radical

Activity") James explains that what

transcendentalists have called a category of' causation and have found to exist

or

the mind itself, actually is found in free

will or spiritual. causality, as a definitely experienced relation.

Thus, radi-

cal. empiricism not only offers evidence for freedom but uses the fact of freedom
as

a proof'

for its theory of relations.

Meliorism is an aspect of' James' thought that is seldom mentioned today',
but it also has aclear relationship to James' free-will.

II
I

I

man can cooperate with God in building a better universe.

It is the belie! that
James had this to say

of the two parts of his thought in their relation to each other I

• • • persons in whom knowledge of the world's past has bred pessimism
(or doubts as to the world's good character, which becalle certainties
if' that character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome
free-will as a melioristic doctrine. It holds up impl'"ovement as at
least possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion or
possibility is born of' human ignorance, and that necessity and impossibility between them rule the destinies or the world.
Free-will is thus a general. cosmological theory or promise • • • • 22
Pragmatism, in its struggle against rationalism, perhaps owes more than
any other aspect of James' thought to his decision for freedom over determinis:n..
Wor, " • • • the essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is ready-

22

Pragmatism, ,EE.

~.,

p. 119.
\
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made and complete trom all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the
mak:I.ng.n 23

he is

f!!!

Certainly there is no possibility

or

man's "making reality" unless

to do so; in a purely determined block-universe there would be no

room for a theory like pragmatism.
Furthermore, according to pragmatism, truth is something that "happens to
ideas."

Certainly then, we must be free and have some control over the sur-

rounding circumstances of our lite so that truth can happen to our ideas more
easily then it otherwise would have.

It is the core of the "tender-minded"

strain of James' pragmatic method that we are
ity which only we can make to be true.
~nt

!.!:!! ~

choose that part ot real-

Certainly there is the objective ele-

of truth that we only accept, but we cannot let it weigh so heavily upon

us that we refuse to take up the controls and fashion our own
it, therefore, true.

or

future--ma~ing

course, all this relies on the fact that the will is

free.
One

or

the main concerns for James in

~

last work and admittedly his most metaphysical,
be present in the lOrld it: the future is in
lVe have the experiential proof
of the human organism.

or

~

Problem.'3 of Philosophy, his
i~

noveltz.

Logically, it must

sense independent of the pa!lt;

ita presence in the free purposive activity

Only in the choosing and full functioning

or

the human

individual do we find a break in the rigid sequence of a determined universe.
Each man differs from others, not so much because he possesses a different bit
of matter, but by virtue
~ultipl1ed

or

his own interests and effort, and this novelty is

all the more by the free creative activity that each man performs.

2.3rbid. J p. 257.
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man by' his unique individuality resists all classit'ication; be illustrates

this most clearly by his free oreative activity.

Therefore, freedom and

novelty necessarily must go together in James' thought.
With this brief illustration of the impact

or

James' choice

or

freedom

upon his pluralism, radical empiricism, meliorism, pragmatism, and theory of
novelty, the last point
tablished.

or

the thesis

or

this chapter has been tentatively es-

That thesis could be swmna.rized as follows:

inrluenced his view

or

lite and reality, and hence, his philosophy.

was no different from any other thinker or philosopher.
was such that it

r~ired

for the betterment of mankind.

or

a gospel

or

his powers,

effort and a vigorous struggle

(3) The intellectual "circumstances necessary"

within him for the healthful functioning

or)

or

In this he

(2) His personality

the frequent and dynamic functioning

especially' his will, in the form

(the foundation

(1) James' personality

or

his philosophical views.

his 'Will were nothing more than
It was necessary that he view

reality in a manner consonant with a dynamic, outward-driving approach to lit'e;
and, likewise that approach would quite naturally tend to structure his view
reality (a structuring from without and a structuring frOm within).
fore, James I resolution of the problem

or

or

(4) There-

free will seems to be both a

~

or

the "circumstances," the philosophy, necessary for his dynamic approach (in the
s'ense that among other Philosophical truths he must intellectually be convinced
also

or

the Will's freedom, for him to be meaningtully exercising it-this is

a structuring from without) and in some sense the center

or

his philosophy

(since' the dynamic approach that characterized all his thought is actually a
real embodiment of his belief in freedom--a structuring from within).

f
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Considering this fourth point we see that the centrality in James' phil-

1

osophy of his belief' in the freedan of the will can be shown in a number of
ways.

As was shown here it had a distinctive influence upon his pluralisml

radical empiricism l meliorism, pragmatism, and theory of novelty.
his doctrine of the

!!!!!

Secondly I

to believe I implying freedom, is his distinctive con-

tribution to the theory of pragmatism.

Thirdly, throughout his philosophical

writings James affirms that the will and its freedom are of foremost concern.
"

Finally, the dominance

or

will-theory in James' psychological writings seems to

point to the importance that it ltlWIt play in his philosophy.

Our study of the

Principles of Psychology and what James has to say there of the freedom vs.
deterMinism controversy will begin with a consideration of this very point.
Now that we have Been James' personal need for the frequent, dynamic fune-

r:

tioning of his volitional nature and the circumstances necessary for that
functioning, which constitute his general philosophical approach to life, let
us turn back to his early consideration of the freedom vs. determinism controversy.

Let us watch how he baDlles the problem, first

&8

an empirical psychol-

ogist (this in our third chapter on the will-theory in the Principles and James'
refusal to answer the problem of "freedom or determinism" there), and then as a
moral philosopher (this in our fourth chapter Where we apply the general philosophical approach

or

this chapter to the particular problem of this thesis l

and come up with James' answer).

We should see clearly how the answer William

James arrived at fits into the "circumstancestl necessary for the dedicated,
productive life that endeared him to all who came to know him and aseured him
a lasting place in the history of American philosophy.

,'"
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CHAPTER III
THE PRINCIPLES:

MECHANISM VS. INDETERMINISM, A DILEMMA

The willing department of our nature • • • dominates both the conceiving department and the .feeling department; or, in plainer English,
perception and thinking are only there .for behavior' B sake. I am sure
I am not wrong in stating this result as one of the .fundamental conclusions to which the entire drift o.f modern physiological investigation
sweeps us. If asked what great contribution physiology has made to psychology of late years, I am sure every competent authority will reply
that her influence has' in no way been so weighty as in the copious illustration, verification, and consolidation of this broad, general point of
view. l
Thus William James leaves no doubt in the reader's mind how he at least
conceives the hierarchy

or

man' B psychological operations.

Though these words

were first uttered in a lecture given at Princeton in 1881 and set .forth in the

!!.!!! ~

Believe, a compendium of his moral. and ethical views, James gives ample

evidence that such also is the measured judgment o.f his pB.Ychological investig
tionB and writings.
In his classic Principles

.2!.

Psychology, (written some years atter the

Princeton address,) James studied the will in such detail that for one today to
even begin to understand James' scientific view o.f man's volitional powers, it
is generally accepted that he must read the entire two volumes and

~~en

return

for intensive study to three complete chapters 2 along with Bome twenty-seve.n
cross references throughout the rest of the book which together would form
lThe ~ to Believe, ~. ~., p.

114.

2Chapters V, "The Automaton Theory," XI, "Attention," XXVI, "Will.a

26
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almost one third of the two volumes.

In every key chapter the voluntary, or

selective, or effort-feellng aspect of the total organism i.8 related to the
matter at hand.3
To acquire more than a passing knowledge of James' view of the freedau of
the will as set forth in the Princ1ples--and this is the purpose of the present
chapter--one must check the relationship that other p8,1chic phenomena could
possibly have on the free functioning of the will.

Practically spea.ld.ng, this

means that one must have most all of the Principles at one's fingertips.
At the very beginning of the first volume we are told that ". • •
pursuance

5!! future

ends and

~

choice

~ ~ and criterion£! the presence

.2!. means

~

for their atta.1r_'llent !!:! thus

of mentallty in a phenomenon. II 4

then, man's will is closely tied to all his mental operations.

Cle~1y,

If one recalls

that for James "attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies~'5
he must further realize that chapters dealing with any kind of psychological
process entailing momentary attention, must be carefully read

tor applications,

3I am especially indebted to ODe invaluable research tool in my study or
the Principlesa Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books .2! ~ Western World, vol.
3, The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of ~ Western !!t:';,ld, Chicago,
19~ Here listed under the word,"will," can be found everyone of James' references to the will throughout the 1400 pages or the Principles, which forms
volume 53 of this Great Books series.
4The Principles of Psychology, ,2£. cit., vol. I, p. 8. In this chapte:'
,
subsequent references to this edition will list only the volume and page number."
Throughout the chapter emphasis in quotations, unless otherwise indicated, i~
,
James' own.

511. p. 561.
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confirmatory or contradictory,

or

what is explicitly set forth in the "Will"

chapter itself'.
To look at this another way, if human thought "is always interested more
in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses,

all the while it thinks,"6 then every important aspect
forth in the Principles, must be studied.

or

human thought, as set

Or again, if' "consciousness basicaJ.~

is always a fighter far ends," then the reader must catch it in the
fighting, and compare what he finds with the general theory

or

~

or

end-fighting.

Hence, it is evident that a theory of will permeates all the parts

or

this

massive work and that any inconsistency in the theoretical exposition of the
will should come out as it is discovered
book.

!!! act

throughout the rest of the

Not only is the will a, foremost aspect of James' moral. philosophy, but

that it also stands a central theme--and problem--of his empirical psychology.
James seems to have made it a point to set down all that he had to say

r ormally or

the will in two long chapters

or

the Principles, "The Will" and

"Attention" whereas other references to the voluntary throughout the text are
only illustrative.

The plan here will be to set forth clearly James' Will-

theory in the Principles with a view to seeing it and how he resolved the : reewill controversy there.

This will be done by a detailed exposition

"Will" and "Attention" chapters.

With the theory clearly exposed

8.S

or

the

a context

for our study, we will place within it James' treatment ot the freedom vs. determinism controversy.

By studying intensively the pages devoted exclusively to

this question and. by close attention to references to it through-out the bco!<,

61 • p. 284. The italics are added.
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ve shaU have seen the way that James considered the problem, the alternatives

I
I

he set himselt along with his resolution ot those alternatives, and the consiBtency and excellence

or

his answer to the problem of free-will.

Before we begin a word or two about the sources
be helpful.

or

James' will theory ltigb.t

James' psychology of the will is a combination

or

two doctrines,

one concerning the feeling of effort, and a second, ideo-motor action.

Both

doctrines were set forth in one of his earliest papers, "The Feeling of Effort,"
published in 1880. 7 Later in 1888 he republished his views under the title of
"What the Will Effects,n8 in more popular form and with less stress on their
phYSiological aspects.

James said of this article that it excited more comment

than all of his others put together.9

Both article s, mentioned in the first

footnote of the "Will" chapter, are valuabl'9 in that they illustrate Ja..-nes'
earlier views

or

his will doctrine, set forth in somewhat different fashion fro!!}

the detailed, mature exposition of the Principles.

The two essays and the ifi';i1P

chapter differ only in presentation; their content is substantially the same.

or

the two doctrines that comprise James' psychology of the will, only the

"feeling of effort" doctrine is

direct~

pertinent to the problem of free will.

James' full will-doctrine, however, must be presented to avoid the

tr~ ... t.P.lent L_

a truncated problem and to ensure a balanced context in which to place his discussion of the

~

and its full meaning to the free-will problem •.

7Found in Collected Essays and Reviews,

£2.

~., pp. 187-219.

8Scribner s Magazine, III, pp. 240-250.
'
9cf. Perry, vol. I, p. 702.
letter dated March 29, 1888.

James made this statement to Renouvier in a
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"Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone knows, which no
definition can make plainer. ltlO Thus, William James, in his own distinctive
way, begins his long discussion of the will toward the end of the second volume
of his Principles ~ PSlchologz.- The diligent reader cannot suppress a sigh of

relief at encountering this "Will" chapter, for, man's voluntary and selective
teoo.encies have permeated all that has gone be! ore, am a formal, treatment of
the volitional aspect of the human organism is certainlY in order and long
desired.
This chapter, and James' full treatment of will-theory can be divided into
eight parts of varying length and importance:

(1) an introductory section,

treating voluntary movements of the instinctual. type, along with a thorough refutation of the "feeling of in."lervation" theory,
action after deliberation,

(4) the states of the will,

as possible springs of action,
the mind and its ideas,

(2) ideo-motor action,

(6) the will-properl

(3)

(5) pleasure and pain

it is a relation between

(7) the question of ufree-will,"

(8). the education of '

the will.
With the exception of the eighth part of James' will-theory, one can perceive in this chapter a steady progression from instinctive reactions, to ideomotor actions, where the mind plays some part, to acts following upon deliberation, which can be pleasant and flow smoothly, to acts that are difficult, that
entail the feeling of effort.

The progression is from purely organic reactions

(on a sub-human level) to difficult, fully deliberate, attention-absorbing
decisions (calling into play all the distinctively human powers of the organism);!

10II. p. 486.
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it is a progression from those human reactions most removed from the concern of
this paper to those that most directly point out and perhaps solve the freewill problem.

(As a preliminary note) one Should be forewarned that, contrary to the
initial statement of this chapter, the "will"--at least as James is using the
term here--does not convey one meaning obvious to everyone that "no definition
can make plainer." For James, the will is something totally within the mind;
it is a distinctive, precise relationship between an idea and the mind, that
usually issues forth into action, response.

f'Usuallyt' is deliberately inserted

here, for, whether the response actually takes place or not is irrelevant to
the question as to the presence of a volition in the mind.

"The movements ",'hich

ensue are exclusively physiological phenomena, following according to physiological laws upon the neural events to which the idea corresponds.

The willir..s

terminates with the prevalence of the idea; and whether the act then follows or
not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the will itself goes. all
Likewise, the mental operations preparatory to getting the idea before the
mind have nothing to do with volition.

get ahead

or

ourselves in presenting James' will-theory, still it seems neces-

sary that we know more or less the area
James'

Though to discuss these matters is to

or

concern when we are busy observing

"will."

One final preparatory note is necessary.

It concerns the approach that

James wished to take inLhe Principles, and the relationship of that approach
to philosophy.

In the preface James expressed his viewpoint well:

llII. p. 560.
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I have kept close to the point or view or natural science throughout the book. Every' natural science assumes certain data uncritically,
am declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws l obtain and fram which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the
science or finite individual minds assumes as its date (1) thoughts and
feelings, and (2) a )ht;SiCal world in time and space with which- they
coeXist and which \3 ~ know. or course these data themselves are
discussable J but the dISCiis'BIOii or them (as or other elements) is call Ed
metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book,
assuming that thoughts and feeling exist and are vehicles of knowledge,
thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical
correlation of the various sorts or thought or feeling with definite conditions of' the brain, can go no farther--can go no farther, that is, as a
natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. 12
There is no doubt that this was James' approach as an empirical scientist.
But as a fully-living and deeply-thinking individual he could not forego a
concern

~th

the teeming richness and immediacy of personal experience.

The

resul t is that parts of the Principles can leave the reader with a diff erent
impression from that intended in the preface.

Ralph Barton Perry' has this to

says
He always lef'tthe impression that there was more J and that the more
to came might, for all one knew, throw a very different light on the matters under discussion. He respected his universe too much to believe that
he could carry it under hie own hat. These saving doubts arose from the
same SOll"ce as his tolerance and respect for his fellow man. The universe,
like one I s neighbor, is nElTer fully disclosed to outward view, and_ the last
word must be a consent that the other should in the end be itself.1..3
A further result of James' refusal to'1gnore the data of his own personal

experience led to his frequest digression in a very unempirical manner to metaphysical questions, like the exiBtence of the soul and the freedom of the will.
To the skilled philosopher and the trained psychologist this mixing of two areas

12I. pp. v-vi.
l~uoted in Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology,
New York, 1950, p. 192.
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of lmowledge may prove annoying .. but to the general reader it ie the source of

rich enjoyment. Furthermore .. it was the only way that James could write psychology.

In this connection the final chapter of the Principles .. "Necessary

Truths and the Effects of Experience .. " is important in its detailed study of
psychogenesis for the strange blend of psychology and philosophy that it
trates.

illUB-

Gardner Murphy has said that "just as Wundt was the systematic psychol-

ogist par excellence.. so James might be called the

~s.ystematic

psychologist par

excellence." 14
Just how much philosophy is in the classic of psychology that James wrote
is too vast a question to be discussed here.

We will strive only to watch and

call attention to the presence of the two in James' will-theory.
Let us begin now the first of our eight parts dealing with Ja."lles' willtheory .. that which concerns his study of voluntary movements of the instir:.,tu.::U

type.
When it 1e said that J,ames l first division

or

the "Will" chapter deals

with the instinctive aspects of the organism .. there is

obvio~ly

a need for

so~e

qualification.. since purely reflexive, instinctive responses involve no volition
whatsoever.

The intention rather is to study those reactl.,

vi man that in-

volve just enough advertance and attention to push them across the threshold to
volitional action.

As a soientist James wants to know the limits--here t:1e

minimal limite--of the behavior pattern that is to be studied.

He

mw,: t

minimal requirements f or voluntary movement; once discovered they can

L~

.',

...,
:'v .....
h.:>

1;.:,

in constructing a complex theory to handle all the subtleties that are evic.', '~"
in everyday living.
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All voluntary acts are secondary functions of the organism, James discovers; whereas,
Reflex, instinctive, and emotional. movements are all primary performances.
The nerve-centres are so organised that certain stimuli pull the trigger
of certain explosive parts; and a creature going through one of these
explosions for the first time undergoes an entirely novel experience. l5
For an action to be willed its idea must already be in the mind; thus, it
is secondary.

But how do these ideas get into the mind i f they are not (by

definition) the result of voluntary acts, but rather the cause of them?
If in vohmtary action properly so-called, the act must be foreseen,

it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can perform an act voluntarily for the first time • • • we must wait for the
movements to be performed involuntarily, before we can freme ideas of
what either of these things are • • • when a particular movement, r~v. ing once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an
image of itself in the memory, then the movemgnt can be desired again,
proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. l
Reflection upon this fact should give us an

an~Jer:

A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in
the memorYEl experlence .c:!. their involuntai7Perlormance, is thus the
first prerequisite of ~ voluntarl ~.11
James then proceeds to distinguish two types

or

such kinesthetic ideas.

They can be remote, the result of impressions upon the remote organs of
ar resident, the impressions of oneself as one i8 acting.

Since one I

15

s~e,

volltion-

al powers are far the purpose of personal action or reaction, then only the resident ideas are our concern here.

1511 • p. 487.
l6 lbid •
1711 • p. 488.

According to classical. theory there are two

t

J

-------------------------------------------------------~.-types of kinesthetic feelings that can call forth resident ideas, efferent,
those accompanying impulses from the nervous center outwards to the muscle, and
afferent, those accompanying the sensory impulses sent back to the nervous
center by the muscle as it performs its action, thus giving us the feeling of
~

performing it.

Classical theory claimed

kinesthetic feelings in the oper-

ating rubject.

He feels the nerve impulses as they 1ravel out

~

to "innervate" him to action (efferenth and he feels the muscles
form, because they are sending

~

&8

to the nerve center impulses of

in performance-nth-effort (afferent).

the center
they per-

th~"nselves

This minimal feeling of effort-in-

performance that James claimed accompanies every action is important to us,
becaus'e he reverts to it again ""nen he comes to discuss difficult actions where
the "feeling of effort" is quite evidently present and intense.
But it is especially noteworthy that James, in holding to this "feeling of
effort" theory, takes nru.ch time to refute the classical "feeling of innervation"
theory, and in doing so illustrates clearly the norm that he will apply in admitting data for the study of the will.

James revereed a judgment which he. had

himself made formerly, that feeling accompanies the ef'ferent (out-going) current
which innervates the muscle.
Rather, he came to be struck with the fact that the "feeling

or

muscular

exertion consists of an immense number of incoming sensations due to the contraction of the muscles of our glottis, chest, jaws, body and limbs, and to our
strained joints and ligaments and squeezed or twisted sk'in. nl8

In other words,

he rejected the feeling of innervation because he found !!2 feelinf. tl,.J.t "oas

l8nv.lbat the Will Effects,"

OPe

cit., p. 247.
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not sensory, and hence afferent (in-going), on its neural side.

,·

Efferent

nerve impulses must be there, because the muscle acts; but, between the brain
emitting impulses and the muscle operating there is no feeling of innervation.
The only feeling present is that of effort sent
the muscle as it functions.

~

(therefore, afferent) by

The 'proof' for this is that we are not conscious

or

•

t •

• I

'

.. '
\.\

I
I

anything else but the operating muscles.
:.

Perry says that fthe took this position quite independently, and conscious

j

:

,

"

,",1

or

.

a

the fact that the leading authorities, such as Wundt and Bain, 'Here against

him.n19

~

I"

'

The only norm that James cared to use for the admittance of da.ta was

the conscious awareness after introspection of psychological and physiological
phenomena within himself or the subject.

He refused to be swayed by what the

authorities claimed must be there, i f he did not experience it.
we

'.-

I.
'>
!

He says, "I!

admit • • • that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist after

the fashion in which they appear. n20 It seems that psychology came to mean
something different for James than it did for Bain and Wundt.

His refusal. to

turn from the humdrum disorder of everyday experience to exclusive concern in
a neat, fully structured problem of "science," seemed tv mark him off somewhat
from other psychologists of his

~.

,.

In applying his norm 01' conscious experience to the will, James asserted
that

r

• • • !!! anticipatorz image,

1911 • p. 88.

~,

.2! ~

sensorial consequences

.2f.

Cf. also Collected Essays and Reviews, p. 153.
.

2OrI. p. 571.
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a movement, plus (.2!! certain occasions) ~ ~ ~. these consequences
Shall become actual, !! ~ onll psychic state which introspection ~
~ discern ~ the forerunner of ~ voluntar:c ~.2l
Thus, in this introductory section, beside illustrating clearly his norm

or

"conscious experience," James has made it clear that "the idea

is necessary for voluntary action.
is.

It is not the thought

is the anticipation

or

or

a movement"

He has further tried to show what the idea

the innervation which the movement requires.

the movement's sensible effects.

determine what our movements will be.
controversy is to determine

or

~

These anticipations

A question much closer to the free-will

they will be.

the second part of James' will-theory,

It

And this question leads us to

~-motor

action.

Put clearly the question is this:
Is the bare idea or a movement's sensible effects its sufficient
mental"c'Ue; ormuS't"there-be an additional mental antecedent, in the
shape 2f. ~ fiat;-crecISioii, consent, volitional mandate, .2E. other S'ln
onymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement ~ follow1 22
James' answer is that in most cases "tie bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes
an additional. conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express
consent, has to intervene and precede the movement. tt2 3 The cases wi. thout the·
fiat are the more fundamental because they are simpler; the special complication
that the fiat involves will be studied later.
In adopting the theory
original.

or

"ideo-motor action," James did not claim to be

He had found the theory in Lotze in 1870 and somewhat later in Re-

21II • p. 510
22II. p. 522.
23rbid.

•

....,

-,
"

.'

J8
nouvier. 24 According to the doctrine an idea once in full possession of the
mind translates itself' into action automatically.

The work

or

r.:

.
,'"

..

conscious voli-

tion is finished once the idea is firmly instated. For example, to perfonn my
specific act, x, it is necessary to reinstate the idea of x which has been left
t

in

the mind as the result of a previous performance of x.

The idea itself con-

\

..

;

\.\

sists

or

a reproduction

or

the kinesthetic sensations aroused by the original

bodily movements.
James explains this matter clearly:

.'

Whenever movement follows unhesitat~~~ ~mediate~ the notion of
it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action. vie are then aware of nothing
between the conception and the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular
processes come between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of
them. We think the act z and it is done; and that is what introspection
tells us of the matter.~5
The necessary condition behind this, however, is that there are no conflicting ideas in the mind. Either there is nothing in the mind or what is
there does not conflict with the idea that eventually issues forth into action.
1

Thoughts go through our mind but do not issue into act because there are con-

,'1

flicting notions present. We, can state then the general law that
• • • every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the
actual movement which is itS-object; and awakens It in ! ma.x:1..mum-cregree
whenever it is not kept ~ ~ doi~ ~ ~ antagonistic eresentation
present simUltaneously ~ ~ ~.
James takes pains to show that ideo-motor action is "no paradox, to be
softened or explained away."

It obeys the law of all conscious action, for

24cf. Perry, vol. II, p. 88.

2511 • p. 522.
526.
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its very nature is impulsive.

We do not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling wilich we
have is the correlate or some neural activity that is already on its way
to instigate a movement. Our sensations and thoughts are but cross
sections, as it were, of currents whose essential consequence is motion,
and which no sooner run in at one nerve then they run out again at
another.21

,
t

• 't

By thus explaining this theory, which recently has received strong experimental
coni'1rmation,28 James hopes to discredit the popular notion that some "r,.li1lforce" must be added to conscious activity to make it voluntary.

He wants to

prove that although the fiat is necessary in some cases, it is by no means a
universal prerequisite for free acts.
In passing it should be remarked also that the inhibitory ideas do not
involve an express effort or command any_ more than the executive ideo-motor
ideas do.

Just as the bare presence

bare presence

or

or

one idea prompts a movement, so the

another prevents its taking place.

The over-all effect

or

James' full endorsement

action--and its relevance to the problem

or

or

the theory

or

ideo-motor

freedOlll--ie that it gives one the

impression that James is a thorough-going mechanist who holds the automaton
theory to the hilt.
as data received.

The fiat that he has alluded to cannot be merely considered
It seems now that the fiat must be explained, fitted in, not

just accepted.
Or, at . least , at this stage

or

will-theory we have man as an organism per-

21Ibid •
28Cf • Margaret Knight, ~-lilliam James:
Psychology, London, 1950, pp~1-162.
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petually in motion (when conscious); he is like a television camera always
receiving lightwaves from surrounding objects focused upon, then converting
these waves into electronic impulses, and sending them out along the cable.

- or

Man's waking behavior is the story
in his mind, just as the

It

story"

or

the opposing sets of ideas that contend

a tllive" TV camera is the images that it

picks up and sends along in the form of impulses.

A further question, however,

must be asked, which brings us stUl closer to our problem of human freedom.
What determines the presence of the different ideas before our mind?

vie under-

stand how once they are there, by ideo-rootor action they issue forth into
action.

But how does the "live" camera of our consciousness operate?

Is it

manned by a camera-man or is its selective operation left purely to chance?
This leads us to the third part of James' will-theory, action after deliberation.
To explain the meaning

or

James' deliberation let us take a concrete case.

The mind at any moment of consciousness is the seat of many ideas related to
each other in antagonistic or in favorable ways.
.tNo.

I want a cup of coffee now."

'",llull I continue typing?"

nOr should I take a walk and get a bit of

fresh air, so that I can continue working later?"
the act that I will eventually perform.

or

One

or

the ideas is that of

itself it would prompt movement i:

mediately, but other considerations present to consciousness are blocking the
motor discharge, while others solicit it to take place.
The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecisic
• • • as long as it lasts, with the various objects before the-attention,
we are said to deliberate • • • and when finally t.he origianl suggestion
either prevails ana makes the movement take place, or gets definitely
quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter ~ vol-

41
untarz ~ in favor

or

one or the other course. 29

The motives that we may have for deciding at all, or not deciding, could
be an impatience with the deliberative state, or an impulse to persist in a
decision once made--both very cammon and very human motives.
As James sees it there are five possible types

or

decision.

Perhaps it

would be best to let him explain them himself I
The first may be called the reasonable~. It is that or those
cases in which the arguments for ar~ against a given course seem gradually and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to
end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one alternative, wich alternative we then adopt without effort or constraint. • •• In this
easy transition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves almost
passive; the "reasons" which decide us seem to oursel-ves almost to be
flowing in from the nature or things, and to owe nothing to our will
. at all. • ••
In the second ~ of case our feeling is •••. that of letting
ourselves drift 1-1ith a certain indifferent acquiesence in a direction
accidentally determined from without and entirely apart from our- .
selves. • • •
---In ~ third ~ • • • it • • • often happens, when the absence
imperative principle is perplexing and suspense distracting, that
we find ourselves acting, as it were, automatically • • • in the direction of one of the horns of the dilemma • • • • nF'orward now~" we cry
inwardly, tlthough the heavens fall • • • • n

or

The fourth for.m or decision comes when, in consequence of some
outer-experiencec;r-some inexplicable inward charge, ~ suddenly ~s.~
from the easy; ~ careless ~ the sober ~ strenuous mood. • •• lne
whole scale of values of our motives and impulses then undergoes a
change • • • all "light-fantastic" notions lose their motive power, all
solemn ones find theirs multiplied many-fold.
In the fifth ~ of decision • • • we feel, in deciding, as if
we ourselves by our ownWilful act inclined the beam. • •• The slow
dead heave of the will that is felt in these instances ma'u""~' j·' ..
a class altogether different subjectively from all the tb.!'!..".'; l-,rec,,,:, y<.
r_
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,

classes. • • .. Whether it be the dreary resignation for the sake or
austere and naked duty or ali sorts of rich, mundane delights, or whether
it be the heavy resolve that or two mutually exclusive trains of future
fact" both sweet and good ••• one shall forevermore become impossible,
while the other shall become reality" it is a desolate and acrid sort of
act, an excursion into a lon~some moral wilderness.30
Clearly with the fifth type

or

o

,
!

decision" we are coming close to the con-

cern of this paper. For, only where a feeling

2!

effort, absent from the four

former decisions, is present" are we conscious beyond doubt that the decision
made is the result

or

our felt internal effort.

Only

where the decision 1s

...
'0.

difficult and involves considerable effort can we be sure that exterior conditions and phenomena alone can never account for the action that we will.

All

merely animal organisms will without fail function to sustain survival, to
avoid the difficult and to attain the pleasing and protective. This fifth type

..

.\0

of decision is "deliberately driving a thorn into one' 8 flesh,·3l am so it
costs effort.
If examined closely its chief difference from the three former cases

appears to be that in those cases the mind at the moment of deciding
on the triumphant alternative dropped the other one wholly or nearly
out of sight, whereas here both alternatives are steadily held in view,
and in the very act of murdering the vanquished possiblli ty the ch()oser
realizes how much in that instant he is making himself 10se.32
The existence at the effort as a phenomenal fact in our consciousness cannot be doubted. James a.f'f1rms that its significance "is a matter about which
the gravest difference of opinion prevails. Questions as momentous as that of
the very existence of spiritual causality, as vast as that of universal pre-

3°11. pp. 531-534.
3lll. p. 534.
32Ibid. James gives no explanation for his use

.r orr..er

cases.

or

"three" instead of "four"
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destination or free-will, depend on its interpretation."33

It is necessary,

therefore, that we examine the conditions under which the feeling of volitional
effort is found, that psychology search out all the data relevant to these
·.--

momentous questions •
. We have arrived, more or less, at the core of our problem.

A study of the

first part of James' will-theory has given ue the first prerequisite of the
voluntary lite--a supply ot ideas.

We also gained there some insight into

James' nor.m in admitting data for a study

or

the will--"conscious awareness"

it was termed--along with a clear illustration of that norm.

In studying the

ideo-motor theory we were able to catch the will in actual operation, albeit
in a very simple, elementary fashion.

Ideas determine what our actions shall

be; ideo-motor action determines that they shall be.
ask a further question:

We were then driven to

how is the what-determination of a particular idea

connected with the that-determination of ideo-motor action? wnat points the
organism in this direction rather than that, supplying it with this chain
ideas and not that?

or

What holds this idea before the mind rather than that one?

Chance seems to be no explanation.

Is it external. or internal tactors, or

both, that determine this?
We began looking at internal factors in our study of the third part of
James' will-theory.

Along with him we considered action after deliberation,

and the five types of decision possible.

We noticed that the fifth type begins

to furnish some evidence pointing to the fact that the determinant is withl: .

33

IT. p.

535.
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Further, as regards our own study here, we see that in .being a clearly pa.iIlful
decision, it gives hope of proving that volitions are ultimately determined
exclusively by internal

factors--a~

external ultimate determinants that are

painful would eventually result in the death

or

the species, man, or the modi-

fication of the species so as to eliminate painful conditions (here, painful
decisions).

The univerally binding biological law of adaptation is the reason

for this.
Thus, the feeling of effort, according James' norm of "conscious awareness lt offers

~

proof of internal causality.

of its distinct fiat must be studied.

The conditions and implications

Furthermore, other factors must be con-

sider ed, for, consciousness alone is not the ultimate proof; it can be misleadlng, as in the druDkard, the dope addict, or the sleeping dreamer.

Is there

more that can be said about the will proper--the conjunction of the whatdetermination of a particular idea to the that-determination of ideo-motor
action? What about attention?

Before taking up these questions, James di-

gresseas--at least as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned.
In the fourth part of his will-theory James studies the possible states of
the~.

A will can be called healthy if' (l) the non-instinctive motives do.u-

nate the instinctive ones,
actual fiat is made,

(2) there is a sufficient complexity before the

(3) the vision of reality of the actual will is richt,

(4) the action follows the vision's lead.

An unhealthy will is characterized

by action that follows the Bt~~lus too soon (called a precipitate will), or

by an imbalance between the impulsive or inhibitive factors of the will.

If tb

impulsive factors dominate, one is afflicted with an explosive will; i f the
lhibitive, with an obstructed will.

I

in-I"

_
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There!! some discussion towards the end of this section, of effort:
We now see at one view
It does so whenever a rarer
neutralize others of a more
whenever strongly ~plosive
tive conditions overcome. •
moral action were required,
the appearanFes than this:
resistence. 3L.j.

when it is that effort complicates volition.
and more ideal impulse is called upon to
instinctive and habitual kind; it does so
tendencies are checked, or strongly obstruc• • And if a brief definition of ideal or
none could be given which would better fit
~!! action in the ~ of ~ greatest

James in the firth section of his theory of the will considers pleasure
as a reinforcer of action, and pain as an inhibitor.

He asks, what relation

do ideas of them have to the other ideas in the mind?
be the only springs of action.

Some people take them to

This is false, however, because they cant t

explain emotional expression, or the impulsive quality of all mental states.
Furthermore, ideo-motor action, along with voluntas invita and unhealthy aspects
of some pleasurable and impulsive acts,

al~

disprove this theory.

There are a number of complications that could lead to this mistake.

For

example, around all our impulses, there is a secondary possibility of pleasure
or pain accompanying them; thus, the distinction between a pleasant act arA one
pursuing a pleasure is very thin and can mislead some.

Also, there is a :

sure derived from the successful achievement of an act, and. the mind can ve'
easily project imaginatively this pleasure back to cover the entire act,

thl..uK-

ing that it was the sole spring of the action.

James wished to state that he is "not denying the exceeding prominence and
importance of the part which pleasures and pains play in the motivation of c:
conduct. lt 35 He only wants to insist that it is no exclusive pnrt.

3411 •

p.
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back to the main concern of this chapter with the remark:
If one must have a single name for the condition upon which the impulsive
and inhibitive quality of objects depends, one had better call it their

interest.
It seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impulsiveness, not in any peculiar relations which it may have with paths of
motor discharge,--for all ideas have relations with some such paths,--but
rather in a preliminary phenomenon, ~ urgency, namelyl. with which it is
~ to compel attention and dominate ~ consciousness.)6

,!

With this let us move into the sixth part of James' will-theory, his study
of the !!!!-proper.

The specific question is, What is the will-proper, ar.d how

does it operate in concrete instances of choice, espeCially, difficult choices
where the feeling of effort is quite evident?
James arfirtls that all that went before were merely preliminaries; we are

•

!

,"

,

l,

now at the "intimate nature of "the volitional process. tt

Since will is a rela-

tion between mind and its ideas, we are driven to consider the conditions which
make ideas prevail in the mind.

Once the idea prevails the willing is termina-

ted; for, from that point it is merely a matter of physiological. phenomena, the
eff erent nerve impulses and the correct functioning of the organs concerned.
"Volition is a psychic or moral fact pure and simple and is absolutely
completed when the stable state of the idea 18 there n37 before the mind.

". • •
~

~

reaeh the heart

it is that

~

mind. H38

-
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Here is the answer that James gives us to the question, How are ideas held
fast before the mind?
• • • attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies.
The essential achievement of. the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntar:>:,' ~ to ATT1'ND to ~dilTIcliIt"obFct ~ hold ~ fastbefore the
mind. The so-doing is the fiat.39

Or again:
Effort of attention is ~ ~. essential phenomenon of ~~ll. • • •
What constitutes the diffICulty for a man laboring under an WT~se passion,
of acting as if the passion were unwise? Certainly there is no physical
difficulty. It is as easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one,
to pocket one's money as to squander it on one's cupidities, to walk away
from as towards a coquette's door. The difficulty is mental; it is that
of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all. 40
A further eX&'l1ple, by way of proof:

Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others--if they"
get ~ quiet hearing; and passion's cue accordingly is always
~~d everywhere to prevent their still small voice from being heard at
all. "Let me not think of thatl Don't speak to me of that~" This is
the sudden cry of all those who in a passion perceive some sobering considerations about to check them in mid-career. 41

~ ~

A final selection, giving still another aspect of James' answer to the
questions

I

Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other way, the atte!l' _en
must be kept strained on that one object until at last it grows, so as to
maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention
is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to our ~~ought of the naturally unwelcome object has been secured. For the myst.erious tie between the thought
and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a way which we cannot
even guess at, the obedience of the bodily organs follows as a matter of

39 Ibid •
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course. 42

.\
;:

It is important that James speak for. himself here, because this is practically all that he has to Bay of "the intimate nature of the volitional process."

-

HiS explanation is clear and his proof for this theory obviously is one I s
"conscious experience."

But, it seems that he never answers the question, How

are ideas held fast before the mind?

He only restates the fact, now in terms

of attention.

James gives us a few further explanatory notes about the will-proper in

,

I

the remaining pages of this section. First, he tells us that the idea must be
held fast till it fills the mind.
sent.

This filling is what we conunonly call .£2!!-

Secondly, he affirms that
• • • the terminu.1! of the psychological E.rocess ~ volition, ~ point
to which the ~ is directll applied, is al·t1a;y-s ~ idea. • •• l'h~
resistenc 7 which ~ ~ ~ possiblZ experience is ~ resistence
w ch such an 1dea offers to being attended to at all. ~o attend to it
is the vplitIonal act, aoothe oniy inward volitIonal act which we ever
perform. 43

0fiiY

From this it is clear that will is not a relation between the sell and the
'1

"out-there"; rather, it is between the self and our own ideas.
Thirdly, there are cases of consent without the idea filling up the mind.
In the fifth type of deCision, for example, at the very moment that we

eOflSB!lt

to the idea of the action to be performed, its contrary is present to the mind,
and it is this simultaneous presence of contrary ideas that makes so intense
the feeling of effort.

Thus, here the effort to attend is only a part of what

the word, "will," covers; it covers also the effort to consent to sOlnethi.t1g

4211 •

p.
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to which our attention is not quite complete.
for the painful effort that is felt.
~

any thought

This is another way of accounting

ForI "it is unquaJ.1fied.ly true that i f

fill the mind exclusively • • • the thought l for that time at

any rate, carries the man and his~ll with it. n44
James concludes this section with the assertion that this business

or

willing
• • • is one of' the most familiar things in lite. We can partly enu."nerate its conditions; and we can partll trace its consequences • • • •
But the change itself Lin the will-ac!! as a sub j ective Phenomenon is
something which we can translate into no Simpler terms. 4~
In seeing what James has to say of the will-proper, we seem to have set-

or external.

He has claimed that "the strain of' attention is the funda."l1ental

act of will," or again, that "effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will."
determinant.

Therefore, it seems obvious that attention is the fundanental
If the ultimate determinant of a volitional act is the

operation of attention, is the problem of the

!reed~

or

in~9rnal

the will then resolved?

There seems to be internal causality; is man, therefore, free? For James the
question is not that simple.

By way

or

approach1ne his view

let us take a close look at what he has to

s~

of attention.

or

the question

If the free-will

controversy centers about the operation of' attention, then to solve it, according to Jamesian psychology, we must first know what attention is for him.

Attention is "the taking possession by the mind in a. clear and vivid form

44 rI •

p.

568.

45 rI •

p.

569.
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or

one out

or

what seem several simultaneously possible objects or

thought. Focalization, concentration,

or

So
trains or

consciousness are of its essence. n46

If we bear in mind that James affirmed that "attention with effort is all
-

that any case or volition implies," then it would seem that in studying attention we are studying the will.

This is clear where he says that attention may

be either passive or active and voluntary; this is easily comparable to the passive and active aspects
no help to our study

or

terized by the reeling

or

the rive types of decision.

Passive attention is of

freedom, but we see that voluntary attention is charac-

or

J
'I'

efrort.

"

• • • we get it in the sensorial sphere whenever we seek to catch ~~
irlpression of ext.reme faintness, be it of sight, hearing, taste, s:r:.~ll,
or touch; we get it whenever we seek to discrL~ate a sensation merged
in a mass of others that are si1:d.lar; we ret it whenever we resist the
attractions of more potent stimuli and keep our mind occupied with sorr.e
object that is naturally unimpressive. vie get it in the intellectual
sphere under e."{actly similar conditions: as when we strive to sharpen
and make distinct an idea. which we but vaguely seem to have; or painfully discriminate a shade or meaning from its similars; or resolutely
hold fast to a thought so discordant with our impulses that, i f left·
unaided, it wou~~ quickly yield place to images or an exciting and impassioned kind.

All these instances are obvious examples of will-acts, in James' very broad
use

or

the term.

It is interesting to note the effects
is that "each

or

2!.

attentions

its remote effect

us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things,

what sort or a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit.,,48 The immediate
effects

or

attention are to make us perceive, conceive, distinguish, remember

46r. pp. 403-404.

47I.

p.

420.

48 I. p.

424.

••

*

=1'

1M

tS"'.'

st',

n't St' tt

_. t

to

" t

51
better than otherwise we could.
Towards the end of the "Attention" chapter James asksl
Attention a Resultant or a Force?"

tlls Voluntary ,

This is basically the same question that

he asks at the beginning of the seventh section of the "Will" chapter, the
question

.2!:

"~-!!ll.ft

These two sections of the Principles should be studied

"

~

together, for, it will be seen that the answer that one gives to whether voluntary attention is a resultant or a force, will determine the way that one resolves the question

or

free-will.

But, first the context of the question must

be seen.

In this seventh section James passes beyond the mere affirmation that
lIif we admit • • • that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist

after the fashion in which they appear ,tI 49 to a much deeper question.

Now that

we have the data of our experience, what does it mean, what does it tell us
about the problem of free will?

To take our clear instance of voluntary action,

the fif'th type of deCision, we want to knows

" • • • is the effort where it

"

exists, a fixed function of the object, which the latter imposes on the thought:
or is it such an independent 'variable' that with a constant object more or
less

or

it may be made?n,O Or, in terms of the "Attention" chapter, is volun-

tary action a resultant or a force?
In the first instancelt would have to be affirmed that we are deceived.
in thinking that we are entirely responsible for the feeling

or

etfort that

49II. p. 571.
50 Ibid •
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accompanies an act and tells us that we are the ultimate determinant of a "free
choice."

I

.,

Rather, the effort is a fixed function of the object, which by an

inherent quality that it possesses, automatically determines whether or not we
will keep an idea

or

it before the mind and eventually will it.

There is no

need for a cameraman; the TV caroora is automatically drawn by same strange
magnetic force within the objects that it is picturing, loihich causes the camera
to picture these objects and no others at this time.

When we think in choosing

this rather than that, that it is we who are freely making the ultimate decisio
we are deceived.

There is no free-will; there is only a fully determined uni-

verse.
In the second instance, effort is.a variable within ourselves, completely
independent of the objects to which it may conform the attention.
the clear instance of one difficult object, there is freedom

~o

So that in

exert

~

ef-

fort to hold an idea of the object clearly before the mind so that ideo-motor
action can take its course, or

~

effort with the result that the action we

perform is not in the direction of the difficult object, but of the easier
•

effortless alternative.

In either case the full decision lies within ourselves.

There is a cameraman, in full control of the situation, pointing his TV camera
in whatever direction he wishes with the result that the electronic impulses

coming away are freely of his choosing.

Our wills are truly free.

We must now study the evidence for either of these Rl.ternativesj the IIAt_
tention" chapter handles it more clearly in terms of cause and effect.
If feeling is an inert accompaninlent, then of course

• • • the attention which we give at e:ny time to p .... v S'.1bjf'~t. • • • is
the fatally predetermined effect of those exclusl,· ,I matE y al la",:~.
If, on the other hand, the feeling which coexists 'W.i..th the brain-cC'J..ls f
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activity reacts dynamically upon that activity, furthering or checking
it, then the attention is in part, at least, a cause. 51
First, we see that "as regards immediate sensorial attention hardly anyone
is tempted to regard it as anything but an erfect ... 52

As for derived attention

--it owes its interest not to itself but to association with Bome other immediately interesting thing--where there is no voluntary effort, it also seems to

... I
• I

!

be a mere effect; because, the mind is drawn automatically by the pleasing associations that are connected with the object.

"I

As for voluntary attention,

James first presents a very powerful case for the effect-theory.
First of all we see that
The things we attend to come to us by their own laws. Attention creates
no idea; an idea must already~e~cre before we can attend to it. Attention only fixes and retains what the ordinarz laws of association
bring 'before the footlights! of consciousn3ss.~3
But once you admit this then it is clear that attention per
and retain the ideas then it need bring them.

~

need no mera fix

The associations which bring them

can also fix them by the interest which they lend.

Thus, as regards

~

effort

.. '.

to attend,
We think we can make more of it i f we will; and the amount wh1.~h we
make does not seem a fixed functIOnCit--:uie ideas themselves, 8.tj it
would necessarily have to be i f our effort were an effeot and not a
spiritual force. But even here it is possible to conceive the facts
mechanically and to regard the effort as mere effect.54
To take an example, let us say that a young man is trying to entertain
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thoughts of death in the presence of his S\'1eetheart.
is at the cost of great effort.

• ,

If he succeeds at all, it

The thoueht of his sweetheart goes on of its

own accord, while to keep the thought of death foremost in his mind, the man
must continuously offer voluntary reinforcement, with the result that at each
of these moments there is a strong feeling of effort present.
he freely wills to think of death.

But

dynam1cal~

He thinks that

it could mean only that the

associative processes connected with death are really stronger, and in the
girl's absence they would give him a passive unimpeded attention to death.

Her

presence neutralizes part of the brain energy which would otherwise be available
for fluent thought.

What was lost is converted into feeling, in this case the

feeling of effort.
James gives an excellent illustration here of how effort could be only a
passive index of what is done, that clinches hie argument for the effect-theory
of attention.
The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole easy simple
flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the pull of
gravity, and effortless attention is the rule. But at intervals an obstruction, a set-back, a log-jam occurs, stops the current, creates an
eddy, and makes things temporarily move the other way. If a real river
could feel, it would feel these eddies aM set-backs as places of effcI!'t.
"I am here flowing," it would say, "in the direction of greatest re~lsttr(l..t:1
instead of flowing, as' usual, in the direction of least. My effort 1.1:;
what enables me to perform this feat." Really, the effort would only be
a passive index that the feat was being performed. The agent would all the·
while be the total downward drift of the rest of the water, forcing S(,T.''-'
of it upwards in this spot; and although, on the average, the direction-of
least resistance is downwards, that would be Mreason for its not bci:'..:~
up;{ards now and then. Just so with our voluntary acts of attent.i 0r'. "
are momentary arrests, coupled with a peculiar feeling, c1' .::' :.. '
stream. But the arresting force, instead of being this pec·lic'.,r fet ,...
itself,. may be nothing but the processes by 'Which the collision is produced.:;,5

55 I. P. 4'50.
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Thus, we see that the notion that "our effort in attending is an original. fac-

.
,

\

'

ulty, a force additional to the others of which brain and mind are the seat,

,6

may be an abject superstition. n

But, it seems that the evidence f or the other side of the coin is just
It is just as easy to show that the laws of stimula.tion and of as-

as strong.

sociation form only the stage background for a star performer, the voluntarz
effort to attend.

"Nature, I say, may indulge in these complications; and the

conception that she had done so in this case is, I think, just as clear (if not
as 'parsimonious! logically) as the conception that she has not."'7

Therefore,

man's will may be free; the evidence for this view is the feeling of effort that
is clearly in our consciousness.
We are faced with a dilemma.

Both the freedan and determinist sides of

the argument seem equally backed by evidence.
be an easy matter.
different way.

To resolve the problem will not

In the "Willn chapter, James poses the dilemma in a slightly

There, he places on the side of freedom the evidence of all our

painful actions where it seems that t.he effort is an independent variable.

On

the determinist side he places the fact that all man's effortless volitions
"are res,ultants

or

interests and associations liIhose

stre~th

and sequence are

mechanically determined by the structure of that physical mass, his brain; e'::id
the general. continuity of things and the monistic conception of the world may
lead one irresistibly to postulate that a little fact like effort can form no
real exception to the ove~nelming reign of deterministic law.n~o
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Here is James' answel' to the dilemmaa

,

;

'

.

My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on
strictly psychologic grounds. After a certain amount for attention
has been given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether
either more or less of it might have been given or not. • • • Neasurements, whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and deductive reasonings such as th is method of proof implies, will surely be forever beyond
human reach. No serious psychologist or physiologist will venture even
to suggest a notion of how they might be practically made. We are thrown
back therefore upon the crude evidences of introspection on the one hand,
with all its liabilities to deceptioD and, on the other hand, upon ~
priori postulates and probabilities.~ 9

James applies the criteria that he set down in the preface and
here that since objective data cannot settle the

dile~~a,

sort to discussion of the data, and this is metaphysics.

affi~

we are forced to reIn the preface he con-

tended that
• • • psychology, when she has ascertained the empirical correlation
the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite condition~ of
the brain, can go no farther--can go no farther, that i~~ as a r.atural
science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. v

or

Once you begin to discuss the meaning of· your data--which is a necessity for the
resolution of our freedom vs. determinism dilemma--you have passed beyond the
limits of empirical psychology and are
not fit into the scope

philo~ophizing.

Since philosophy does

or this book, then the problem of free-will cannot

be

h:mdled here.
A

further proof of the philosophical. nature

or

this problem ean be found

in the fact that, although in the ItW111" chapter James presented a systematic

and distinct study of reflex acts, then ideo-motor action, followed by ded sions
thout effort, and finally decisions with effort, he would be the first to

591bid.
6°1. pp. v-vi.
,*

,.
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affirm that in actuality all these operations are going-on at once and merging

,

'

together so imperceptibly that the scientist could never be sure of the original
sources

or

the different phenomenal causalities operating there.

Also, James seems to opt for a kind of neutralism with regard to the problam when he points out that where two forces of ideas are contending for pos-

.'

!

session of the mind, and one through its abundance and dynamism wins its way
to actiqn, we tend to "call the more abundant mass of ideas ourselves; and
talking of its effort as .22!. effort, and of that of the smaller mass of ideas
as the resistance • • • • "61 But, in reality "both effort and resistance ,_~
ours, and the identification of our self with one of these factors is an illusion and a trick of speech. u62
James concludes this section with a defense of his stand concerning the
question of free-will.

He affirms that science demands uniform causality that

can be traced to a clear determined source. Yet, everyday-living clearly shows
that people are making choices wherein they experience indeterminate feelings
of effort, and where no one can point to a sole cause for the action.

This fact

is not a scandal to science and. psychology; rather, science will continue to
work within its own order, and will perhaps complement the wider order of philosophy.
Psychology will be Psychology, and Science SCience, as much as ever
(as much and no more) in this world, whether free will be true in it
or not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes

61II • p. 516.
62 Ibid • Perhaps this is a foreshadowing of tIle theory of pure ex:perience
,mich James set forth so clearly in the "Does Consciousness E..xist?" chapter of
Essays in Radical Empiricism.

.0,..
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are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which
she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped
in a wider order, on which she has no claim at all.
We can therefore leave the free-will question altogether out of our
account. 63
The eighth and. final sect:ton of James' theory as set forth in the "Will"
chapter,

~

education

£!

the will, is concerned mainly with the effect upon

the organism of choices made, and the way that those Choices are physiologically
carried out.

By definition James has excluded this matter from will-theory,

and therefore,it will not be treated here.
Thus, we have exposed at length William James' general theory of the will,

thl3
i

;~1O

alternatives that he set himself, the fact that as empirical psychologist

fe}_t thnt the d.ata a1."ailnble did not warrant a choice bet..reen the t,,·o alte:--

natives.
The many references to man's volitional nature trn"oughout the rest of this '
ma.ssive work would deserve detailed study here if they pointed up strikingly
n~f

aspects of the problem, or contradictions in James' treatment of it.

Cer-

tainly they raI:(;e over a wide variety of topics, fro![l the relation:~hip of belief

land the will, association and the voluntary, voll tional nature as the cause of
'man's structuring 'of reality, to ethics and the training of the will, the making of the future by one's own choices, and arr;un1cnts for and

10:.'

Mtomatism.

a;~a;

nat the the0ry

But all these rc.ferences contribute little r.:ore thc.n a clear

j~nlustration of the matter set c.oT,m in the "Will" and "Attention" chapters.

63 I 1. p. 576.
,:a

.

'

-
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' . 'i,I

I

Obviously, James had been studying the will far many years, and there was little

room for arr:r contradiction in the will-theory that has come to be known as

.

!I

I

distinctively his.
Further, he seems to have made ita point to set down all that he had to
say formally of the will in these two long chapters--together they come to

"I

almost 110 pages--so that other passing references to the voluntary are only
illustrative.
In conclusion, it must be noted that although it is clear from James'
,other writings where he stands as a philosopher in the freedom

VB.

<,i

determinism

controversy, it is no less clear from the Principles itself that he felt freedom of the will to be the only meaningful solution to the problem.

'
•H' reeo.O:!1

.las mea:lingi'ul to h:Lm as a philosopher and necessary for him as a man.

At

various places throughout the two volumes, when the problem was casually alluded
to in treating other matters,

J~~es

often broke the train of thought to affirm

his stand as a philosopher in this matter.
Toward the end of the "Attention" chapter James most clearly adverted to

I

.,' I,

his "will to believe1t argumentation where he said that he felt that
••• the whole feeling or reality, the whole sting and excitement of
our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it ~.\\lngs are really
beine decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull
rattling off of a chain t.loJ.at was forged innumerable years ago. This
appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such a tragic zest,
May not be an illusion. 64
From his few open confessions of his own belief in this matter to his

"

r~-

peated eulogizing of effort, it is quite clear to the reader that Ja"llcs has
exe::-ciG8d the free will that he believes in" before all else, to opt for his

64 r • p. ) r:')
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right and willto believe.in
_the
- freedom of man's -will.
the following chapter.

But more of this in
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,
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CHAPTER IV
THE WTI.L TO BELIEVEs

A MORAL SOLUTION TO THE mOBLEM

James completed the Principles in 1890, and the years that immediately
followed saw his gradual change of role from that of professional scientist to
moral philosopher.

Hardly intended explicitly the change merely reflected his

shift of personal interest.

"

:

~.

This shift of interest could be most clearly seen

in the growing number of philosophy courses that he taught, to the point loihere

he finally transferred to the department itself.

••

In 1892 Hugo Munsterberg,

later taken along with James to be one of Harvard's brightest lights at the
tUrn of the century, was invited from Germany to direct the laboratory that
James had set up some years before.

By 1896 James' psychological interests

.'

.;.

had even waned to the point where he declined to attend the International Congross of Psychology held in l1unich in the summer of that year, although the

.

Principles was much talked about on the continent at the time.
The middle 90's were a time of browsing, of travel, and
for James.

or

popular

leQtur~s

His thoughts were tending more and more towards the deeper problems

of philosophy, but always considered as problems of life rather than of theory_

The abstract metaphysical manner in which so many wrote philosophy at that time
often perplexed him.

He unintentionally attacked the work of his good friend,

G. H. Howison, by referring to the "triviality in abstracto," of metaphysical
writing.

In answer to Howison's questions James replied:
61

__
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The word came out or one Who is unfit to be a philosopher because at
bottom he hates philosophy, especially at the beginning or a vacation,
with the fragrance at' the spruces and sweet ferns all soaking him through
with the conviction that it is better to be than to define your being.
I am a victim or neurasthenia, and or thesense of hollowness and unreality that goes with it. And philosophic literature will often seem
to me the hollowest thing.1
---Nevertheless James did not hesitate to become a philosopher, both in private
interest and professionally, because for him philosophy dealt not with trivialities in abstracto but with the urgent realities

or

man

~

"

concreto.

...

"Release from the pressure and discipline imposed by the writing of the
Principles, II Perry tells us, "rendered him again vulnerable to brooding melancholy; and he felt again the need

or

a saving gospel. ,,2

..

I

·1

There was an expansion

of his human sympathies at this time, and of his political and social activities.

The 90' s were the decade of the Spanish-American War and the Dreyfus case

both of which stirred his "moral emotions. '1

, 'I

He became active in the Society for

Psychical Research, and this stirred up an old interest in religious mysticism,
along with the strange experiences connected with it that James felt had to be
accounted for as tactual data.

Perry has called this decade James' period of

reform and evangelism.
One result

or

this period

or

James' lit'e is a volume ent1tled

Believe ~ Other EssalS in Popular Philosophy.

~

' ... «

Will to

Published in 1897 and dedicated

to "my old friend Charles Sanders Peirce," it was made up of articles and addresses written at intervals from l879 to 1896.

Chiefly concerned with an in-

div1.dualistic fideism, the book, Perry tells us, is pervaded throughout by the

I

lFrom a letter to G. H. Howison dated July 11, 1895, as found in Perry,
vol. II, p. 207.
2 Ibid ., p. 208.

I

,__--------______________.______

influence

or

~AA_·--.~'-tc_·

____.C_-_______________________________

.~._6

___-___(

Renouvier--ttcribbed from Renouvier," James once wrote to Peirce.)

Before discussing the "tender-minded" theory of meaning set forth in this
book and before seeing how James applied it to the free-will controversy, we
must first understand clearly wiat he meant by belief, and its relation to the
will in the "will to believe. n
In the second volume of the Principles James begins a chapter, "The Perception.of Reality," with a discussion of belief.

This seems not so strange

when we note that he defines belief as "the mental state or function of cognizing reality. 1t 4 He takes pains to distinguish it from imagination; for, when we
imagine an object, he says, we merely apprehend it in some internal way, but
when we believe in it, it is not only apprehended, but is also held to have
reality. Furthermore, we can obviously distinguish belief from action.

Belie!

is internal, a purely mental disposition toward some reality; action is our
physical entrance into and upon that reality.
From the PE'evious chapter of this thesis, it should be clear then that will

-

has a relation to all three of these operations of the organism--imagination,
i:

belief, action.

As we saw there, the materials of volitions are ideas.

imagination is the mere apprehension of an

~,

:But,

ignoring its possible reference

Ii
,I

to reality; belief is apprehension and acceptance of an

~

as embodying a

reality; action is the personal entrance into reality as the result of the full
presence to our attention of an
terminus of

~

~

psychological process

J ef • Perry, vol. II, p. 209.

4QE. ~.,

vol. II, p. 282.

to that effect.

.!!:

Since, for James,

volition, the point

.!:.2. lmich

fI£~

~
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I
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!! directly

applied,

!!.

always ~ ~,,,5 and since an idea in each of the cases

mentioned determines the operation, then it is clear that the will can determine
what we imagine, what we believe, what we do.
-

The discussion in the "Will" and "Attention" chapters of the Principles
was carried on almost exclusively in the context of action, of freedom of action
because of freedom of will, of the idea of an act as the material of a volition.
But, it is quite clear that external action is just one operation of the organism that is determinable by the will.

We must remember that these chapters in

the Principles could have been written in the context of ideas-determiningbelief instead of ideas-determining-action.
belief-consent.

Beside

action-conse~t

there is

In fact it can be said that the only difference between an idee.

of action and an idea of belief is the physiological resultants of the

f~er.

In the last chapter we viewed James' treatment, as an empirical psychologist,

of the idea of an action. Here we will study his views

or

the idea of a belief,

this time as a moral philosopher.
Looked at in this light, as the determinant

or !!!. ~-laden

operations

or

the organism, the will, along with the question of its freedom, is clearly seen
to be a central problem in the philosophy of man.

If we bear in mind this een-

trail ty of will for James, we will want to observe the manner in which he handles belief, now as a moral philosopher, so

dB

to use what we find as evidence

pointing to his full mind concerning the will's freedom.
stance of the organism's operation.

Belief is a clear in-

The will clearly influences it.

To note

'I

;1
I

what James, as a moral philosopher, holds concerning that influence and what it

'The Principles of Psycholoe;y, ,2£. cit., vol. H, p. 567.
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means, is to find James' views concerning the will and its freedom

!!!

action.

Furthermore, the study of belief, rather than action or imagination, is
far more philosophically meaningful, since for James what one believes con...,
i

-.1,

stitutes one's perception of reality.6 The question arisesl

If the will is

free, can one fashion one's reality to fit one's wishes? We may have the power
to decide hoW' we shall act.

But do we have any choice as to how we shall think?

It seems that reality can only be accepted, not made.

But i f the relationship

between the will and belief is as Janes says it is, and if the will is free,
then it seems that we can make our own reality. Which is true, the absoluteness
of reality or freedom of the will?

Or

is this a false dilemma, in the sense

that Ja.'Tles' analysis of will and belief, and their influence on reality is 'WrOng?
Or have we misunderstood his doctrine, creating for ourselves this false di-

lemma?

Answers to these questions should emerge in this chapter as we study

James' philosophic views of the free-will controversy.
First, we must understand James' general fideistic approach to philosophy
before we can grasp intelligently its application by him to the problem of free
will.

This approach was most clearly set forth in a lecture given at Harvard

in the summer of 1895, and later published as the lead essay in the volume bearing its name, The Will

~

Believe.

James begins "The Will to Believe" with a discussion of hypotheses, showing that for an hypothesis to be eligible for free choice it must be living

(meanineful to the chooser), forced (to be decided immediately), and momentous
(not trivial). When a hypothesis conforming to these conditions is present,

6The title of chapter XXI of the Principle~ which begins with a study of
belief.

.
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then our non-intellectuaJ. nature is sure to influence our decision.

.1

.,.
, i

. I

...

In fact

James first states his thesis thus:
~

passional nature not only lawfulq may, but must, decide an option
between propOSitions, whenever !!! is ~ genuine option ~ cannot £l .
its nature ~ decided .2E: intellectual grounds; for to say, ~ ~
circumstances, liDo not decide, ~ leave ~ question open,tI is itself
~ passional decision,--just like deciding yes £!'E£,--~ is attended
wi th ~ risk of losing the truth. "
When is it proper that the will should determine belief?

James actually gives

__

.

0"

two answers. First, when abstinence from belief or suspension of judgment means
losing the chance of truth, and so is equivalent to a disbelief which is no
..

better proved by sensible fact than the positive or more fruitful belief.

Sec-

ond, when the effect of conviction is to bring about the very facts which will
verify it.
To take the first case, he is saying that when we must make a decision, and
we cannot make it on rational grounds, we are free to make it upon emotional
grounds.

If there is no better rational basis for accepting an hypothesis than

for rejecting it, we have a right to do as we wish, to believe as we desire,
providing we recognize that our decision is purely an emotional one.

In sclen-

tific matters it is better to refuse to believe anything till all the evidence
is in.

.

...

But, as we noted in the second chapter, for James the really importa.."lt
The individual's way of looking at

questions in ille are all beyond science.

things are all that he has for answering moral questions.

When dealing with

them he cannot wait till all the evidence is in, to make a decision.
cern what does not now exiBt, what is in

7The Will to Believe,

OPe

t.~e

They con-

future, whereas science deals with

cit., p. 11.
I

il

•
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what is here and now.

In fact, in personal and social relations maZV facts

would never exist, were there not passion and faith prior to the fact, aiding
to bring it about.

This brings us to the second part

or

the argument f or the

will to believe.
Besides our right to believe in matters where science can give us no help,
James affirms that belief that something is true may make it true when before
I

it was not so.

In some few instances belief can thus run prior to fact and lead '

it where it will.

A look at the subtleties involved in man's interpersonal

relations will easily establish this.

If the first time that 'you meet someone

I

you treat him as if he is your friend, when actually he is not, you may succeed I':
inmak1ng him so.

The young man who has lost his heart to

a maid who

conSiders!

him but an acquaintance, may by the ardor of his persistent attentions touch

her to the point where she may reciprocate his love.

Or, to take the famous

example that James set forth in the second essay of this work, one may decide
that iife is not worth living and the pessimism induced from the decision will
probably result in a life that is indeed not worth living.

Or, one can adopt

the faith that it indeed!.! worth living am through that determination make it
so.

The attitude, once taken and adhered to, creates its own verification in

subsequent experience.
The theory of meaning behind both these arguments for the will to believe
is highly individualistic.

If the belief makes a real difference in the life of

the believer it must be accounted meaningful.

But this does not mean that man l s

non-intellectual life is to be left free to run wild, nor that man is not to be ,
rational in the ordinary course of what he believes.

Perhaps more than any

other aspect of his philosophy James' will to believe doctrine has been mis-

.".___. . . . . . .'_. .
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understood by his critics.
For James the will to believe is a

~

resort, something relied upon only

when other means of attaining the truth are inadequate.
must fit into the intricate and-complex mesh

or

What it arrives at

truths that have preceded it.

It also must produce results that by their richness and fertility will surficiently verify the meaningfulness and truth
according to the doctrine
only in the face

or

or

or

the belief at hand.

this essay, the will to believe is validly used

a genuine option--one that is liVing,

r at"ced,

Often the option between losing truth and gaining it is not
a case one can wait.

Furthermore,

and momentous.

meme~tous.

In such

I

On less important choices man must search for objective

evidence and refuse to make up his mind until it has come.

This is the case

with many of the occasions for belief in our everyday life; we simply suspend
our judgment.
In the case

or

scientific method the proper understand::! ng

matter at hand can be quite momentous.

ot the objective

I'

Does this mean that we must resat"t to ;

the will to believe immediately and take a stand?

No J because although the

OP-'I~
,

tion is momentous, it is seldom living or forced.
experiments the mind must maintain an attitude

or

In fact in most scientific
delicate balance between a

hunch that the matter "is this way," am a conviction that the reality itself
will reveal its nature without any help from one'a personal views.

The more the

observer can divorce himself from the matter observed, the more assured he can
be of the objective validity

or

what he finds.

Thus, viewed as James himself clearly saw it, the will to believe is not
willful subjectivistic tool for fashioning all of one's private world.

Rather,

since man finds himself in a world where empirical method cannot solve all of

I,

I":

I'

69
the problems that arise, one must have at hand a method that can be applied for
those problems beyond science and its method, that nevertheless must be solved
here and now, and whose solution will make a real difference in the life of the
individual.
Looked at in this light, the will to believe can be seen as a part of
James' general pragmatic theory of meaning.

That theory would embrace on one

hand the pragmatism of radical empiricism, and on the other, the will to believe, a tough-minded theory and a tender-minded one.
The rigid scientific arm of James' pragmatism holds that the way to understand an idea is to envisage its possible consequences in experience.

To grasp

the full range of possible consequences of' a statement is to grasp the entire
meaning of' the statement i tsel!.
there is no meaning.

Where there are no consequences in experience

But strict adherence to such a norm would rule out very

many phenomena that could give so much meaning to our lives.

Therefore, there

must be also a less rigid, tender-minded arm of' pragmatism.

This is the (area

or

for the exercise

the) will to believe.

But, with the will to believe it is not the statement that must bave conse- ,
I

I'i

quences for experience if it is to be meaningful, but rather the believing of

,

the statement.

II

Here one deduces the meaningful consequences not from the state-

ment, "God exists," but from the fact that someone believes it.

If personal

belief in God colors one's attitude toward life and makes a difference, then

'II
:lli

I'

there is meaning.

Here in the will to believe is an anthropocentrism even more

:1

(!i
"

intense than Kant'

B

"Copernican Revolution."

Unlike the tough-minded arm of

1,1;'

'i!:

James' pragmatism, the will to believe considers not the consequences of an
affirmation, but the consequences of man's belief 1n that affirmation.

Tius

,II

I'

r.

t

iII
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aspect

or

the will to believe will prove most important when James comes to

apply it to the problem

or

free will.

One of the most succinct formulations
is given in ~ Pluralistic Universe.
what he calls his "faith-ladder."

or

James' will to believe argument

There he sets forth in full the steps

or

No clearer proof can be given that James en-

dorsed the will to believe throughout his philosophical career than its full
elaboration in this volume less than a year be! ore his deathl

A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is
it true or not? you ask.
It might be true somewhere, you say, for it i8 not self-contradictory.
It mal be true, you continue, even here and now.
It is ~ to be true, it would be ~,g: it ~~, it ought to
be true, you presently feel.
It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then
--as a fInal result-It shall be held for ~, you decide; it shall ~ as if true, for ycu",
A.'1d your acting thus may in8 certain special cases be a means of mak- I
ing it securely true in the end.
To James it is clear that "not one step in this process is logical j n8 yet,
it is no less desirable than logical thinking.
personal to himself J all

or

This is not a way

or

thinking

us operate this way, lIit is the way in which

mOnists~i

:11

and pluralists alike espouse and hold fast to their visions."9

Some meJ:1.·may

!li
il :

care to affect utter rationalism in all of their livesJ however, in choosing

!I
I

their visions, the things that really matter to them, they cannot ignore the

iii!
ii

faot

or

I

IIlife exceeding logic," of "the practical reason for which the theoretiq:
:111.1

reason finds arguments after the conclusion is once there. tl9

':i

.,'
1.1

'il

,Ii:il

I','

8A Pluralistic Universes Hibbert Lectures on the Present Situation in
Philosophy, New York, 1909, pp. 328-3~9.
-- ---
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Along with James let us now apply the will to believe to the problem of
free will.

In the very long, fifth chapter of the

~

to Believe he takes up

the problem under the new heading, "The Dilenuna of Determinism."

Given as an

address to the Harvard divinity students in 1884 and published in the Unitarian
Review in September of that year, this chapter represents the core argument that
James had been using for Bome time
Shadworth H. Hodgson.

~th

his determinist but very dear friend,

Their correspondence and bits of James' argument date

back to at least five years before the 1884 address.

There, as well as in the

"Dilemma of Determinism" chapter, James refused to consider the problem as siln.ply a discussion of whether the will is free or not; rather, for him the problem must be situated, its implications must be looked full in the face.
wise, this moral question of free
would be unsolvable.
pluralism vs. monism.

~11,

"'

Other-

like its psychological counterpart,

Freedom vs. determinism is more clearly the struggle of
In James' mind the disputants must realize and admit that

it is a question of whether we live in an optimistic, passive, block-universe
or in a world, fraught with peril, but alive and dynamic.

In a letter dated

Dec. 30, 1885 James accuses Hodgson of ignoring this fact, of accepting without
any advertance the world as a "whole."
The question of free will owes its entire being to a difficulty you
disdain to notice, namely that we cannot rejoice in such a whole, for it
is not a palatable optimism, and yet, if it be predeterr.unea, we must
treatit as a whole. Indeterminism is the only way to break the world
into good parts and into bad, and to stand by the former as against the
1atter. 10
.
True to fOmi, James does not care to discuss the problem at all unless he
can do so in terms of the realities we see about us in the world.

\~hy

does he

10perry, vol. I, p. 632.

I~

..
72
want so badly to be able to break the world into good and bad parts?

I

I

I

Here is

his answer to Hodgsonl
• • • life is evil. Two souls are in my breast} I see the better, and. in
the very act of seeing it I dQ the worse. To say that the molecules of
the nebula implied this and shall ~ implied it to all eternity, so
often as it recurs, is to condemn me to that "dilemma" of pessimism or
subjectivism of which I once wrote, and which seems to have so little
urgency to you; and to which all talk about abstractions erected into
entities, am compulsion vs. "freedom," are simply irrelevant. What
living man cares for such--niceties, when the real problem stares him in
the face of how practically to meet a world foredone, with no possibilitie
left in i t?l1

··1

Here we see the James of whom it was said in our second chapter that he
had a need for unsureness, for novelty that is fraught with the danger of failure, for a complicated and unclear series of forces that left alone would probably lead to destruction.

He did not so much reject determinism in general as

monistic determinism, in which the world being all of one piece, must be approved or condemned as a unit.

The moral will for him must have a pluralistic

environment; firat, so that good may not be compromised with evil} secondly, so
that one moral will is not compromised with another.

With this second reason

we see James' individualism combined with his pluralism.

The world is "a sort

of republican banquet • • • where all the qualities of being respect one an-

other's personal sacredness, yet sit at the common table of space and time. n12
These different arguments, or various aspects of the same argument, must
be studied more systematically for us to see clearly how James as a moral phUosopher resolved the problem of free will.
"Dilemma of Determinism" argument.

To do this let us go back to the

Let us follow carefully the sweep of its

llperry, vol. I, p. 6)2.
l2will to Believe, !?E. cit., p. 270.
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thought.

Let us

scrutin1z~

carefully each thread that will be woven into the

strong argument for freedom of the will within a pluralistic universe.

..
-"

This is

~.

J

James' central argument; it should be understood clearly before we move on to
,

..

-

consider complementary arguments, along with the consistency

or

...

....•

"

James' thought

concerning this problem up to the time of his death.

. ..

"

James begins this fifth chapter with the firm assertion that the free-will
controversy is very much alive today, that the "juice" of vigorous argument is
present even more than in the past; he proves it by referring to all contemporary writers who have grappled with the problem.
asserts:

More to our concern, he then

J

"I thuB disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove to

you that the freedom of the will is true.

The most I hope is to induce some

you to follow my own example in assuming it true, and acting as if it were

.
\

true.,,13

.

or

1

\

-,'

By such argumentation he shows that this chapter will fit well into
;.

the view and method of the Will

~

Believe.

He then goes on to quote almost

verbatim one of the first statements that he himself had made shortly after the
successful outcome of the orisis of 1870.

H• • •

our first act of freedom, it

we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free. H 14
Before setting forth his argumentation James gives two suppositions upon
which his proofs will rest.

They merely explicitate further the will to be-

lieve context within which he wishes to consider the problema
• • • first, when we make theories about the world and discuss them with
one another, we do 80 in order to attain a oonception of things which sha.ll
give us subjective satisfaction; and, second, if there be two conceptions,

l3Ibid., p.

14Ibid.

146

Cf. chapter two above,

~ote

eight.

~'.
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and the one seems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other I we
are entitled to suppose that the more rational one is the truer of the
two. 15
.
From the use that James makes of these suppositions it is clear that he wishes
to assert from the very beginning that moral argwnents are equally as valid as
scientific--in fact, within their own context they are to be preferred.

-All

our scientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods. 1I16 For James
freedom and variety are no

~ore

subjective than necessity and uniformity, typi-

cal scientific postulates.
As a final introductory note, James proclaims that he will not use the
word, "freedom."

Its eulogistic overtones, he fears, have blurred its meaning

to the point where even determinists claim that their doctrine is but freedom
properly understood.

His friend, Hodgson, had certainly done this repeatedly.

Rather, he resorts to the neater terms, "determinism" and "indeterminism."
remains only to define clearly the meaning

at

It
i

these words batore we can begin

,Ii

the argument.

III

:1

"Determinism professes that those parts of the universe alrea.d1' laid down
absolutely appoint and decree wnat the other parts shall

be.-

Iii
1,1

1 7 In a determ1n-

i
I

i'l

~nd

'I'
.

P08sibiliti•• that fail to get realized aro pure illusiOlUl.

Ii

istic universe possibilities do not exist) there is only necessar,y fact
impo.sibility.

Chance, which asserts that a thing may fall out otherwise than it actually does, l(
I'

rl',I,

is in no way to be accepted.

It contains an intrinsic irrationality and &Oci-

'Ii
"

dentality.

Once admit chance and your universe falls apart) there is nothitlt

l5Ibid.

[':

l6Ibid., p. 147.
l1Ibid.

"

II'

p. 150.
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but chaos.
"Indeterminism • • • says that the parts
amount

or

bilities.

@ the universi! have a certain

loose play on one another. a18 Actualities tloat in a sea ot possi-

-,.

~

The world is not "one unbending unit of tact,· but is a pluralism

where real possibilities play some part in what will become tact.
only f'that no part

or

Chance means

the world can control absolutely the destinies of the

whole. n19 It allows us to break up the universe into parts.

It places man in

a world where he has some role to play other than passive drifting with fact;
it accounts more fully for man's inner need to fashion his future.

Chance means
.. :>1j

nothing more, as far as man is concerned, than his indeterminate cfuture voli.

tions.
The issues are now clear.

Two opposing views of the world confront each

other as contradictories; only one

or

them can be true.

The reader, however J

should not deceive himself; he is not to look for confirmatory evidence in reality.

"Postulates of reality," not scientific eVidence, separate the two views

of the world.

The argument will be decided by the personal meaning that can be

derived from adoption of either view.
To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it,-to that man more rational with possib1lities excluded, and talk as
we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us monists or
pluralists, determi~ats or indeterminists, is at bottom always some
sentiment like this. 0
Science can only tell us that things have happened, mere fact, not that 50rne-

l8 Ibid •
19 I bid., p. 158.
2Orbid., pp. 152-153.
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thing else might or might not have happened in its place; and this is the l89'el
upon which the argument for indeterminism must progress.
James begins the argument proper with a consideration of the obvious fact
of regret in the world.

Regret implies that some action or fact is bad, re-

gretable, and this amounts to affirming that the fact ought not

!:£ be.

For a

determinist to affirm that something ought not to be is to contradict himselt,
since tlought" implies that it could have been otherwise; it implies indeterminism.

In the light of this it is quite clear that for a determinist to be con-

.

sis tent he must accept absolutely everything that he finds in the world as
irrevocable, as part of the whole from all eternity.
But every man, whatever side he takes in this controversy will admit that
there is much of what ordinary men call "evil" in the world.

A mother and

father lose their six children as a locomotive destroys a packed school-bus. A
man in cold blood smashes the skull of his wife as she lies wCWlded pleading
with him to remember their moments of tenderness together.

A young girl or 17,

who has cleverly escaped to freedom in British Hong Kong, bitterly weeps that
,there is no room for her, that she must be sent back to communist China where

-

in revenge she will be abused physically and morally.

that the determinist must accept as a determined part
f or him there is no

II

These are brutal facts

or

his universe.

Since

oughtJ' he must accept them as being equally as true and

desirable for all time as the tender love that he experiences from his dear
ones, the self-sacrifice he observes in his dedicated confreres, the lifegiving unity he derives from a belief in God.
But the determinist is human, and in the face of the horrible evils that
for consistency's sake he must value as much as the very thines that make life

i:

il,Il

~

;
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worth living, his only response is pessimism.

The true, consistent determinist,

in the face of evil, is condemned to pessimism.

Determinism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead, virtually
defines the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible,
--in other words, as an organism whose constitution is afflicted with
an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw. • •• I see no escape from
this pessimistic conclusion. • • .21
The issue then is resolved to one of pessimism vs. human regret.

If' the

determinist could but hold bis philosophic views so tenaciously that he could
crush all feelings of regret, then he might attain some comfort, and some consistency.

But

alas~

This cannot be done.

.

'

Those judgments continue to push

themselves forward in our unguarded moments, and we see that flour determinism
leads us to call our judgments of' regret wrong, because they are pessimistic

'I
1

I'

in implying that what is impossible yet ought to be. tt22

I,

1,1

Thus, a true dilemma has developed for the determinist.
side of his life is opposed by the human, personal side.

The theoretical

It seema that he is

doomed to inconsistency:
The theoretic and the active life thus playa kind or see-saw with each
other on the ground of' evil. The rise of either sends the other down.
Murder and treachery cannot be good without regret being bad. regret
cannot be good without treachery and murder being bad. Both, however, are
supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world. It must be a place of which either
sin or error forms a necessary part. From this dilemma there seems at
first sight no escape. Are we then BO soon to fall back into the pessimism from which we thought we had emerged? And is there no possible way
by which we may, with good intellectual consciences call the cruel ties ~I
and the treacheries, the reluctances and the regrets, all good together?2)

21rhe Will!2 Believe, P,E. Cit., p. 161.
22 Ibid ., p. 16).
23I bid., pp. 163-164.
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Or, in other words, is there no way by which the determinist can have an absolute block-universe, and still be consistent--in the face of present evil in
the world?
.. r_
Yes, there seems to be a method, a vay out, by which the necessary evil
acts we erroneously regret can be good, and also our error in so regretting
them can also be good; it is called by James, subjectivism.
Subjectivism has three branches,--we may call them scienticism, sentimentalism, and sensualism, respectively. They all agree essentially
about the universe, in deeming that what happens there is subsidiary to
what we think or feel about it. Crime justifies its criminality by awakening our intelligences of that criminality, and eventually our remorses
and regrets. • • • Its use is to quicken our sense of what the irretrievably lost is. When we think of it as that which might have been •••
the quality of its worth speaks- to us with a wilder sweetness; and, conversely, the dissatisfaction wherewith we think of what seems to have
driven it from its natural place gives us the severer pang. Admirable
artifice of nature~ we might be tempted to exclaim,--deceiving us in order the better to enlighten us, and leaving nothing undone to accentuate
to our consciousness the yaWning distance of those opposite poles of good
and evil between which creation Swings.24
This is not a healthy subjectivistic approach to problems

or lite that are be-

yond science, where the subject cannot divorce himself from the matter at hand.
Rather, this is an insidious total subjectivism, where for the sake of conaistency, the determinist subjects all happenings that take place in the "out
there" to their meaning and value for the private consciousness of the subject.
Thus, the true dilemma

or determinism is clear, the dileDfta to which James

refers in the title of this essay.

The truly reflective determinist is forced

to choose, between total, crushing pessimism resultant upon the necessary evils
of his blOCk-universe, or weak, sentimental subjectivism, reducing all reality

to its cash-value in personal thrills and satisfactions. This is a

24Ibid ., pp. 16,-166.

dila~a

..

19
whose right horn is pessimism and mose lett horn is subjectirlsm.

"If de-

..

terminisM is to escape pessimism, it must leave ort looking at the goods and
ills or lite in a simple objective way, and regard them as materials inditterent in themselves, tor the production

or

consciousness, scientific and ethical,

in us.,,25
To one who understands to some degree James' general philosophic approach
to reality and the personal needs that called torth that approach, it should be
clear that he could never opt tor either hom or this dilemma.

To live within

a necessary block-universe, where evil must be accepted as or one piece with
good, never to be striven against, would be personally intolerable.

Yet, to

inhabit a purely personal world, possessed or no evil, where onets consciousness
is the only reality, where action ot any sort is absurd, would lead to James'
debility and the quenching

or

his desire to live.

James felt constrained, therefore, at this point
claim boldly his personal credo, indeterminism.
with determinism and the two horns
~

is intolerable f or any man.

or

or

the argwnent to pro-

He would have nothing to do

the dilemma that it called forth.

In place

or

Pess1-

subjectivislll, and the cozy anti-

ceptic world that it wishes to create tor itself, James would gladly welcome
a broken-up world full of evil aM' vice.

"Not the absence ot vice, but vice

there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal hwnan state. n26
As James sees it, subjectivism, and thus determinism, is to be ruled out
on many counts.

It leads to corruption; it makes the passive man all the more

25 Ibid ., p. 166.

26 Ibid ., p. 169.

"
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passive, and causes the active to seem as madmen.

Why do anything for this

..."•.

world of ours, if one I s consciousness can be stimulated as easily by passive
reception
istic cast

or
or

what the flow of events brings?
mind.

Subjectivism fosters the fat&!-

.' .

By so doing, it encourages men shamefully to pour forth

their energies in every type of spiritual, moral, and practical license.

Or,

for the less spirited, it offers the lotus delights of doing nothing in a
comfortable cosmos made ot bland goodness.
From the crushing defeat of pess1misa and the grand elusions orsubjectivi51ll James offers a third way, that ot action.

or

determinists he effectively quotea Carlyle:

In answer to the two camps
"Hang your sensibilitiesl

your snivelling complaints, and your equally snivelling rapturesl
your general emotional tomt'oolery, and get to WCRK like men\1I27

Stop

Leave off
He expresses
, -.i

his own very personal convictions in less direct fashion:
No matter how we feel; if we are only ta1thfulin the outward act and refuse to do wrong, the world will in so tar be sate, and we quit or our
debt toward it. Take, then, the yoke upon our shoulders; bend our neck
beneath the heavy legality of its weight; regard something else than our
feeling as our limit, our master, and our law; be willing to live and die
in its service,--and, at a stroke, we have passed from the subjective into
the objective philosophy of things, much as one awakens from same feverish
dream, full of bad lights and noises, to find one l s self bathed in the
sacred coolness and quiet of the air of the night. 28
The essence of this prosaic philosophy
recognition of one's limits in the face
that lies before us.

or

or

action lies, first of' all, in a

evil and the :i.mmensity

or

the t a s k ,

Secondly, it lies in the trust that, after bringing about

same external good, we can be at peace with the knowledge that at least we have

27Ibid., p. 174.
28Ibid., p. 174.
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done something, and that tittle "something" has made a d1.tference. Further,
we must remember that "our responsibility ends with the performance of that
duty, and the burden of the rest we may lay on higher povers. n29
In addition to his rejection of the dilemma of determinism, James offers a
further argument in favor of his indeterministic view of the world.

He recalls

to our minds the obvious fact that men spend their lives working vigorously for
various causes.
parts.

As parts of the universe they are clearly art ecting other

In their work they often achieve what they call

accompanying joy and sense
feel that this is bad.
ences?

or

accomplishment.

It

success," with its

Also, at times, they "fail," and

How, explain all these patent tacts and clear experi-

Indeterminism seems the only ways

• • • the only consistent way of representing a pluralism and a world
whose parts may affect one another, through their conduct being either
good or bad, is the indeterministic way. What interest, zest, or excitement can there be in achieving the right way, unless we are enabled to
feel that the wrong way is also a possible and natural way,--n&y, more,
a menacing and imminent way? And what sense can there be in condemning
ourselves tor taking the wrong way, unless we need have done nothing or
the sort, unless the right way was open to us as well. • •• Only then
is it other than a mockery to teel, after we have failed to do our best,
that an irreparable opportunity is ~one from the universe, the loss of
which it must forever atter mourn.)
Only indeterminism can explain the experiences that ve as men have in our daily

lives.

And along with indeterminism, James asserts, we must now accept all

that accompanies it, possibilities, chance, pluralism.
With his argument completed, James moves on in the last part of the chapter to consider two typical objections :that are UBually urged against plural-

29Ibid., p. 175.
30Ibid., pp. 175-176.
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istic indeterminism; first, that' chance and pluralism, once allowed

88

• !t

part of

"-",,,

the universe, will lead to utter chaos where "anything goes," to the swift de-

III

.' ,

incompatible with divine providence, which is a meaningful beliet tor many

..

people, and therefore, to be respected.

~,

,.:..

.' :--.
'"

not restrict the providence to "fulminating nothing but fatal decrees,.)l then

~.~~

"

,
!':."

you can "allow him to provide possibilities as well as actualities to the uni-

ours • • • • ,,)2 His actions may be related to ours as those of a tournament

,

win; he cannot

of events

to come out to the end that he wants, leaving the choice

•

/

,·.,1,

'

,

" ' I

•

actions to his novice adversary.

of possible

So also is the case wi th God and man.

In answer to the first objection, the destructive aspects of chance, James
aftirms that "chance means pluralism and nothing more,")) and. then goes on to
declare that
If some of the members of the pluralism are bad, the philosophy of plural-

ism, whatever broad views it may deny me, permits me, at least, to turn
to the other members with a clean breast of affection and an unsophisticated moral sense. And if I still wish to think of the world as a total-

31Ibid • , p. 180.
32 Ibid • , p. 181.
33rbid. , p. 178.

,

\'

.

all the possible moves of the novice, and he knows in advance how to meet each
Thus, victory infallibly arrivesJ he infallibly directs the course

.

,

But, he knows

of them.

I

I
"

verse, and to carry on his own thinking in those t\JO categories just as we do

foresee exactly every actual move that his opponent \Jill make.

,

,

...-.'..'

In answer to the second objection James attirms that as long as you do

He intends to

'::
'

~.

struction of the very order that it claims to respect; second, that chance is

chess player who sits down to play with a novice.

I
"

,

,
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ity, it lets me feel that a world with a cnance in it of being altogether
good, even if the chang~ never come to pass, is better than a world with
no such chance at all.>4
In an effort to clarify matters for his objectors, and to win them to his way
of viewing the matter, James goes further to specify just what kind of chance
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Thus, James completely turns the table on his adversaries.
structive, but those who repudiate it are.

I

Chance is not de-

.

, I
'

It is our only hope, and those who

;. !

deny it, either do not understand it, or are blinded by their deterministic
•

views.

~

!
.,,' I
.' ,

he means-to opt for.
Just this,--the chance that in moral respects the future may be other
and better than the past has been. This the only chance we have any
motive for supposing to exist. Shame, rather, on its repudiation and
its deniaH For its presence i!J!l the vital. air which lets the world live,
the salt which keeps it sweet.)'

~

.

.~'

I

, '.i 1 ;

James concludes "The Dilemma of Determinism" with this little argumentl
he urges his reader (or listener) to assume along with him that determinism is
the correct view of the universe.
foredoomed to the error
f or the winding up

or

or

'

,

.' ,

"If it be so, may you and I then have been

continuing to believe in liberty.

It is fortunate

controversy that in every discussion wi ton determinism

this argmnentum ~ hominem can be its adversary's last word.",36
Now that we have finished our exposition
this fifth chapter of the!if!l

~

35Ibid., p. 179.
36Ibid., p. 163.

James' argument set down in

Believe, let us reconsider it in the context

of the main purpose of this thesis.

34Ibid •

or

It is oUr aim here to praY'e clearly that

,~,

,
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James resolved the determinism vs. indeterminism controversy in favor of freedom, that as a moral. philosopher he unreservedly believed in the doctrine of
"The Dilemma of Determinism," his main argument to that effect, was

free will.

written in the middle 80' s •
the rest of his life?

The question arises.

Did James hold this view for

In his writings can evidence be round that, tor the

twenty-aix years left to him after that address to the divinity students at
Harvard, he continued to exercise his will in favor of the will' a freedom?
Yes, evidence can be found.

...' ,
~

Let us study it briefly and evaluate it.

Before that address of 1884 we see that James had been considering the
problem.

In 1876 he accepted from Renouvier a proof affirming that thinking

must be free if it is to be either true or talse.

It can mean nothing, as

James sees it, to discuss the question of freedom unless you are tree to affirm
,

or deny it.

He put it this waya

"In wery wide theoretical conclusion we must

seem more or less arbitrarily to choose our side. • ••

But i t our choice is

truly free, then the only poasible way of getting at that truth is by the exercise of the freedom which it impl1es."37
In 1882, in a letter to Charles Renouvier, he again expresses his beliet
in freedom of the will, and this time views it as a moral postulate.
I believe, more and more, that free will • • • must be accepted &8 a postulate in justification of our moral judgment that certain things already
done might have been better done. This implies that something different
was possible in their place. The determinist, who calls this judgment
false, cannot consistently mean that so far as it actually was rendered,
a truer judgment could have been in its place. • • • The only way in
which he can save the rationality of~e world to his own mind, is by
taking refuge in an absolute optimistic faith which says the world as a
whole is the richer and better for having had that error, that evil, in

37Collected Essays ~ ReViews, QQ. ~., as quoted in Perry, vol. I, p.
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it at that particular place and t1me.38
In Talks

~

Teachers, a little-known work

or

stressing the short-lived quality

or

voluntary attention, and explaining what

,

·

....

James' published lS years

after the "Dilemma of Determinism" address, we see James the psychologist

~

'

~.

j
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"
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will is.

He stops his explanation to affirm definitely that PI myself' hold
.......

with the free-willists • • • • "39

His reasons for this supply us with another

argument, varying slightly from those we have seen thus far; he opts for free-

.,

'-.

-.' ~.
1

,

'

dom, "not because I cannot conceive the fatalist theory clear1:,y, or because I
fail to understand its plausib1lity, but simply because, if free will!!!:! true,
it would be absurd to have the belief in it fatally forced on our acceptanceJt 40
Suppose free will to be true; then the situation as we truly find it, with
people believing as they wish and with James declaring firmly for freedom, is
"

explainable.

'

James affirms that he can hold this view "with the best of scien-

titic consciences, knowing that the predetennination of the amount of my effort
of attention can never receive objective proof • • • • nUl
Let us move now to a consideration

or

the more philosophical writings that

flowed from James' pen in that very important last decade at his lite.

It is to

this decade that we are entirely indebted tor &Il7 "system" that 18 p!"esent in
James' thought.
In the college year, 1902-1903, James set his fundamental. thoughts in order

38Perry, vol. I, pp. 682-683.
39Ta1ks to Teachers ~ Psychologrl
Ideals, New York, 1899, p. 191.
4Orbid., p. 191.192.

LI Ibid ., p. 192.

and to
-

- - - - or
-

Students on Some

Lite t 8

,

.-

86
for a course in liThe Philosophy

or

~

,

Nature- (Philosophy J).

Although the syl-

labus that he prepared for this course consists in large part only

or

headings,

it is considered by Perry to be "perhaps the most comprehensive statement

or

his philosophy that James ever made. 1142 The central theme of that syllabus was
James' doctrine

or

"tychism."
~

James seems to equate tychism there with "freedom, chance, necessity,

~[I:
..
~.

•.1,..

""I,

truth, fact," as "ultimate terms.,,4J
piecemeal data

or

Tychism is the name that he uses for the

.;.-

"

: "1

our pluralistic universe, along with what those data imply

about the plan of the universe as a whole.

For our purposes here, we are justi-

fied in saying that tychism is freedom expanded to
~;

. . .I

. , \'V'

~

it is the spontaneous, chance-like aspect of all

status

or

or !

reality.

cosmological
Thus, the

reasons in tychism's favor that James gives there are, in some sense, the reasons in freedom's favor--at least in freedom as a chance-like aspect of all be-

~ .'~
. "!II
•

0

. i.·rl
ii

ings, conscious or otherwise.

'.,

I. Scientific reasons I
1. No concrete experience ever repeats itself • • • •
2. We fail to absolutely exclude originality, by assuming that elements only repeat. Repeat what? -- original elements and modelst
3. Our own decisions suggest what !lcoming into existence" might be
like: "Chancel! from without, self-sufficing life from Within. ~ comes
is determined only when it comes. Ab extra it appears only as a possible
gift or IIgraft."
II. Moral reasons:
1. Absolutely to deny novelty, as Monism does, and to assume that the
universe has exhausted its spontaneity in one act, shocks our sense or
life.
2. Tychism, essentially pluralistic, goes with empiriCism, personal-

42perry, vol. II, p.

43The syllabus can
quotes are from p. 141.

373.

be found in Perry, vol. II, as the ninth appendix.
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, ism, democracy, and freedom • • • •

I

III. Metaphysical reasons:
.
1. Tychism eliminates the "problEm of evil" from theology.
2. It has affinities with common-sense in representing the Divine as
finite.
3. It avoids Monism's doubling-up of the wprld into two editions, the
Finite repeating the Absolute in inferior form. 44

~!
.' I

t"

.Ii
,

,

"

"
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We find contained here

m~

psychological verification (I,

strains of James' thought a pluralism (I, 2),

3),

the will to believe (II,

determinism (III, 1), radical empiricism (III, 3).

1),

the dilemma of

It seems that our own view

of the centrality of freedom to James' thought also receives some confirmation.

Like empiricism or pluralism, tychism is applicable to James' philosophy as a
whole, "turning up that side of it which proclaims the spontaneity and unexpectedness of things. n45

• -!I!I
,- I

, '1

~ '~I

..... 1

In December 1904 James delivered the President's Address before the

"',11

American Psychological Association in Philadelphia, which later came to be
published in Essays

!!! Radical

Empiricism as liThe Experience

or

"J

Activity."

,'!
. 'II

James halts the train of thought of this essay to clarify for his colleagues,
7

by means of a long footnote, some misunderstandings that seem to have arisen
concerning his view of free will, thus offering us a stUl later instance of
his views concerning this matter .46
"Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with e1'tort as we go, hanging

44Ibid., pp. 748-749.
45perry, vol. II, p.

,

663.

46Though Essay~ 1n Rgdicat Empiricism is posthumously published, this lecture saw print in January, 19 , in the Psychological Review, at which time
James must have inserted the footnote.
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on, and finally achieving our intentione-this
it is, James affirms.

!! action"n47

and this is all that

Action is simply factual causality" Dot "the bare illuso-

ry surface of a world whose real causality is an

unimag~ble

ontological prin-

ciple hidden in the cubic deeps. • • ~"48 James in no way wishes to assert a

...."
r.

.

,;

"

....

j

.. !~

f

.~..;:,

"",

metaphysical principle of activity" which wcnld (for him) reduce to a mere epiphenomenon the experience of activity that accompanies our personal' operations.

,~,

..

"

Such a view would contradict his radical empiricism.

He feels that others'

'

'I

beliefs that he holds such a metaphysical principle arises from the misinterpretation of what he has said in the Principles of effort and will.

": I.

James claims that he has always opted for the phenomenalist approach as
opposed to the trans-phenomenal.

As proof, he affirms that he owes all his

doctrine on eff ort and will to Renouvier, who is an
• • • ."49

II

out and out phenomenist

..·. 'i

Whoever interprets him otherwise has been reading bits of state-

ments out of their context.

He goes on to say"

The misinterpretation probably arose at first trOll -.r:I cletend.1Dg (atter
Renouvier) the indeterminism of our efforts. 'Free willi was supposed
by my critics to involve a supernatural agent. As a matter of plain
history the only 'free will' I have ever thought of defending is the
character of novelty in fresh activity-situations • • • • Activity,si tua tions come • • • each with an original. touch. A.' principle' of free
will i f there were one, would doubtless manifest itself in such phenomena,
but I never saw, nor do I nO~J see, what the principle could do except~
rehearse the phenomenon beforehand, or why it ever shoul~ be invoked.~O
James I check upon the interpretations of hi!! colleagues (and our interpre-

47Essaya in Radical Empiricism, OPe cit." p. 183.
48Ibid ., p. 184.

49~., p. 185', footnote.
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tation) is important here.

~

....

To consider hia statements concerning tychiSlll,

am

admitted nothing more than fact, both in his psychology and his moral philosophy.

To adrni t anything from a trans-phenomenal world as Significant is to con-

,

.,."'"'

treedom of the will, spontaneity and chance, as anything more than affirmations

ot a universal fact, is to miss the basic trend ot his thought. James saw

'\

.. - .
~;~ ,

..."".,"

I

, d

'

~:

...,,,..
~

tradict radically his distinctive radical empiricism.
Pragmatisms

!

~ ~

!2!

~ ~

Ways ot Thinking appeared in 1907, a

... ,
..
,
.. ,

. , ;"r

,

complete and systematic preserttation of James' theory of meaning and criterion
of truth.

In the third chapter where there are "Some Metaphysical. Problems

Pragmatically Considered," we find a brier discussion of free will.

"'}

Some peopl

"

,

assert freedom of the will, James says, solely for the dignity that it lends to
man; man can originate and direct his future, they believe, and his dignity is
much enhanced thereby.

Let us rather determine the pragmatic meaning of free-

dom, its possible consequences in our experience.
"Free-will pragmatically means novelties!!!

!!!! world,

the right to ex-

pect that in its deepest elements as well as in ita surface phenOJlena, the
future may not identically repeat and imitate the past.uS!
is the melioristic doctrine that we spoke
general cosmological theory

or

promise.

or

The result of this

in our second chapter, and the

tiThe only possibility that one can

rationally claim is the possibility that things may be better."S2
Free will thuB becomes a doctrine of relief', a gospel; it takes on a religious character, leading man on to greater efforts on behalf
universe.

"our

an improving

spirit, shut within this courtyard of sense-experience, is

51Pragmatism, ~. ~., pp. 118-119.

52;044. J

or

p. 120.

•

I

;

,

"
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always saying to the intellect upon the tower:

'Watchman, tell us

or

the

night, if it aught of promise bear,- and the intellect gives it then these
terms of pranise. H53

By tenacious belie! in freedom of the will, the intellect

gives to our spirit the strength to find its way safely through life's perUse
Thus, free will
cal significance.

~

passed the test

or

,

pragmatism; it is of great practi-

If we bear belief in free will into the darkness of life's

OIl

....

"

:1,.

..

."

·rt'l

thicket, "there grows light about us. n54

~"

To advance by two more years our study

or

the consistency and tenacity

at

· .",

,:

,!' ,

James' option for freedom, we see him considering the argument in Pragmatism's
sequel,

.'!!!! Meaning

~

Truth, 1909.

·

"

Here the discussion differs somewhat in

that it is carried on within a time-context; it centers, however, on the stock
objection of determinism, that freedom am novelty will lead to chaos, disorder,
or as expressed here, to a "breach between the past and future."

'.

James' answer:
.:i

F or the indeterminist there is at all times enough past for all the different futures in Sight, and more besides, to find their reasons in it,
and whichever future comes will slide out of that past as easily as the
train slides by the switch. The world, in short, is just as continuous
with itself for the believers in free will as for the rigorous determinists, onIy the latter are unable to believe in points of bifurcations
as spots of really iIXiifferent equilibrium or as containing shunts which
there--and there gnly, ~ before--direct existing motions without altering their a.mount.~5
.
One final work of James' must be studied before we can consider complete
our exposition of his full views concerning free will.

~

Problems of

~

osopby' was begun by James on March 26, 1909, and was continued intermittently

5.3Ibid., p. 121.
54Ibid.
252.

5'The Meaning of Truth.
-

.! Sequel !2

Pragmatism, New York, 1909, pp. 251-

'1
up t~ the time of his death. August

26. 1910. It va8 never completed. but

James left written instructioM to have it pubUshedt
and unrevised. • • •

,,

....,•
,

"

"Say it is fragmentary

Say that I hoped by it to round out my system. which now

is too much like an arch built only on-one side. n $6 Designed to serve as a

.

college textbook with a wide oiroulation. the book was dedicated to Charles
Renouvier; thus, James ended his philosophioal oareer invoking the man with

OIl

".:'.
"

..

r.''"J
.

whom he began it.

~'

"

Aside from some general remarks concerning human causation,
~

Philosophy does not oonsider man's will or its freedom.

~

Problems

Nevertheless, it

must be oonsidered here, in that it illustrates up to the time of his death
James' oentral oonoern for novelty as a cosmologioal reality.

.' ;

The first eight

chapters of the book follow the syllabus of a oourse James taught at Stanford
"

University in

1906; they deal with questions that James had treated elsewhere,

. ..
~

and center about a study of "percepts and conoepts."

It is in the remaining

five chapters of the volume that novelty is 8tudied in a striking way, and more
profoundly than had hitherto been the case.

This study is made in oonnection

with two of the ola.ssic problems of philosophy. the paradoxes of intini ty and
continuity, and the nature of causality.
The newness of what James is saying here oonsiats in hiB eubstitution of
novelty for his earlier tych1Bl1l.

Perry says that "James came to look upon his

earliest tychism, with its emphasis on sheer chanoe, as only a negative forM of
intellectualism. • • •

The paradox of tyehism--its odiousness to the philo-

sophie mind--liea in its leaving even adjacent existence in a state of total

S6Some ?roblems of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. vii-viii.

...
~
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irrelevance one to another. 1I57

James put in its place a novelty "which, when

...

....•

it comes, seems natural and reasonable, like the tu.l!Ulment of a tendency.
This notion of a 'really growing world' is the general theme
part of the Problems

.2£

or

the latter

...

Philosophy, the theme which bound him closely to Berg-

....

son, and the theme with which he was increasingly occupied during the last years
and months of his life ... 58

.-..'".
~

Thus, we see that up to the very time at his death James' mind was ot one

,~
~

piece with regard to free will, whether he grappled with the problem of human
freedom itself, or was busy discussing the qualities

or

the pluralistic uni-

verse within which that freedom must tit.
To summarize the various arguments that we have gleaned from his philosophical writings, we see that (1) James viewed the controversy primarily in
the context of a "Dilemma of Determinism."

In the Will to Believe he showed

that pessimism and subjectivism are two equally undesirable horns ot a dilemma
that can only be avoided by rejecting the general doctrine that gives birth to
them.

(2) In that same essay, we are given a secondary argument, showing that

indeterminism is the only consistent explanation for the feelings of zestful
joy and sadness to which men are prone as the result
cesses and fallures.

or

their respeotive suc-

(3) In 1876 James accepted from Renouvier a further proof

to the effect that our thinking must be tree if' it is to be true or false.

(4) James viewed freedom of the will in 1882 as a postulate in justification at
our moral jUdgment that certain things alreaqy done might have been done better,

57 perry , vol. II, p. 664.
58 Ibid •

-
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(5) whereas in Talks

!2. Teachers

it amounts to little more than a useful

supposition that will never be proven wrong.
(6) The Syllabus of Philosophy 3 (1902-1903) renders freedom as a cosmolog~ ~J

under the guise

or

tychism it can marshall a host

moral, and metaphysical proof's in its behalf'.

or

scientific,

(7) We are indebted to the brier

'~"!
~~~ i
.....~. .,'.
OIl'

---..! .

section of Essays in Radical Empiricism tor a clarification and check upon our
possible misinterpretation of' tree will.

It is not a metaphysical principle

that would render our conscious experience

or

action a mere epiphenomenon;

'"..

,~lt

..

'

'

:.1,1
~,-.!

rather, it is a universal experienceable fact--and nothing more.

(8) Further-

:

.lI'"

more , it is clear that free will has pragmatic meaning as is clearly shown i n ! ~
Pragmatism, and its sequel, (9) here in terms of' its assurance

or

our smooth
'.

- ~~

passage from past to future, while its adversary cannot handle the obvious

J

,.1

'~~'I

fact of bifurcation of' future choices.

~ p !.

(10) Finally, we have seen that nen up to h1. ve17 death Jaua was deeply
concerned with noveltl, that notion of' a -reaJ.l.y growing world," that central
quality

or

the pluralistic universe

w1~

which thetreedom of' man's will must

fit.
In the light

or

thes. 118117 arguments, acme of which are

h~

distinct,

it should be clear that as a moral philoaopher Jamea exerciaed the tree w1ll
that he believed in, to opt for his right and vill to believe in the freedom at
man' 8 will, and that he did so consistently throughout all hie published writings.
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Some observations concerning James· solution of the treedom vs. determinism

:

"

"

'

-.! '

controversy and the methods he used to arrive at that solution seem to be in
order.

.":".

,01"

This is th e aim of our tinal chapter.
,

We might begin by remarking that James did well in refusing to resolve the
vast problem of freedom by a psychological study of the

tI

....,

"

data" to be t ound with:·1,1

in a single "tree act."

Surely, that data cannot be simply accepted as conf'irm-

i

:,: I

atory of either determinism or freedom; it must be -interpreted" in some sense.
Furthermore, determinists seem to be able always to carry the day, i f the discussion is solely on the level of particular instances of free acts.

.~

." I

I'

They can
~a'

-

point to some determinants (as surely there are always some in every- choice.

.
"

Situation) and then affirm that we are merely ignorant

or

the total range of

determinants, that we deceive ourselves in claiming to experience tree choice,
much as James· talking river deceives itself in thinking that it willtully flows
against the general current, when really it only redounds otf a log-jam with
the force supplied it by the general. flow. l
James certainly contributed to the controversy by his insistence upon its
taking place wi thin a wider context.

lcr. chapter three, note

~ .
...

In this he was much like some contemporary

S5.
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philosophers and psychologists who strive to define freedom in terms
whole man and his Lebenswelt. While not denying the validity

or

or

the

demonstrating

the existence of human freedom from particular examples, like James they insist
that for the controversy to be meaningful it must be carried on within a con-

.
.,.,

text of subjectivity.
Their "subjectivism," however, differs considerably from James'.

For them

the term denotes a methodology whereby man learns to assess himself, his lifeworld, and the inter-relationships between the two, in the ver7 process

or

his

acting as an autonomous subject, an independent person, a value in and to him-

,.6, .'

,

"

"

J,I

:':1 ::
:;1

self.

From his experience of fundamental insertion into the world (Dasein) and

d

:; i

openness to potentialities, and from his appropriation of many of the,objects
of that world into his own personal life-world, man is aware--undeniably--of
his inner autonomy, his inner directedness and freedom.
life-world, an exteneion

or

himself, is also free.

Since he is free, man's

These two facts, man's inner

..

"

'

autonomy as an operating subject and his life-world, are all that 8.D.7 man can
be aware of in human existence.

Since both are experienced as free, we can say

that manl s entire lite is a manifestation to himself

or

;"

freedom.

,

In so far as man can choose to use that freedom to develop hills.It, not at
random or with no particular end in view, but according to a basic orientation
and plan, and in so far as he can decide to order more and more all his actions
to the realization of this goal, it can be said that man has a basic liberty

','I.,

or

action, that he is in his actions an embodiment of a fundamental freedom.
In canparison, the subjectivism of James' will to believe argwnent can
seem pale and lifeless} nevertheless, his olear option for belief in freedom
because of its consequences for future experience seems far oloser to our times

I

,I
'Ii

.

#
-

than the rationaJ.ism and selectiv1ty of many

or

his contemporaries.

The obser-

vations offered here concerning James' tinal solution at the freedom vs. deter- J

minism controversy will tall into two parts, those concerning what he had to
say of the matter in the Principles
to believe methodology.

Any

E!.

Psychology, and those treating the will

criticism will be internal) that is, it will be

based upon the internal consistency

or

....

James' thought and the logical presuppo-

oJ,

sitions behind that thought.
Within the Principles the only norm. that James cared to use for the admittance

or

~

data was the conscious awareness, atter introspection, ot ps.ychologi-

cal and physiological phenomena within himself or the subject. Application

or

this norm allowed him boldly to strike out against the "feeling of innervation"
theory that had received the approval

or

the conventional wisdom of the time.

James said quite simply that upon reflection he found no feeling of innervation

-

prior to his acts) the only feeling present was that sent back (accompanying
afferent, therefore, not efferent impulses) by the muscle as it tunctions. We
are not conscious of anything but the operating muscles. Thus, i f we are aware

as that.
We see James applying this canon of parsimony elsewhere when he affirms
that "it we admit ••• that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they
exist atter the fashion in whiCh they appear."2 This viewpoint is but the result of the arrival

or

psychology to the status

or

an empirical science.

2The Principles of Psychology, ~. ~., vol. II, p. S71.

It
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is something that we have oome to take for granted wi thin the science today,
but which had not been fully realized by its promoters bet ore the turn

or

the

century.
.

-

What is surprising is the fact that this norm was not applied consistently

,. - :

..--~

,
,

~.

throughout the Principles.

In tact, on arriving within the "Will" and flAtten-

tion" chapters at the very point of concern to this thesis, James refuses to

...

-,

..

~,

apply the nonn.

The question as to the will's freedom is not decided there by

the norm of conscious awareness.

James had discussed earlier the obvious fact

of difficult, painful decisions, where the dead heave of the will seems to be
the only determinant.

\'~i

.....,
••,.

He bad even affirmed that at times it seems !.! if we are

freely deciding the future course

or

our actions.

.

Yet, strangely the matter is no longer decided by the simple use of t h i s "

0. .. j

norm, as with the debunking of the "feeling of innervation" theory.

Now there
;i'

is a strong possibility that, although we are not consciously aware of it,
attention is a mere resultant, not a force.
that the feeling

or

As James sees it, there is a chame

eftort, ot which we are consciously aware, is deceptive,

'-"1

,

"

hiding from us the tact that, though we are not aware of it, it is merely an

."1

inert accompaniment to the painful action; 1t 11 brain energy that has been
neutralized by the presence of the idea of the easier thing aDd converted into
feeling of effort.

The stream of our thought could be like a jammed-up river,

which erroneously thinks that it is willfully causing little eodles to flow
against the general current; 1t teels the pressure exerted by the barriers and
is convinced, therefore, that it is the source of the eddies.

The real fact is

that the downward force of the stream supplies tQ.t energy for the eddies, am
the pressure is merely the passive index that the teat is being performed.

'

,I

.~
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If this kind of thinking had been maintained throughout, James would not

have been able to oppose the "feeling

or

innervation" theo1'7.

There is a very

strong possibility that it is there, even though we are not consciously aware of

l".,.~ I~:
,~

,

,

"
"

it--especially since such eminent authorities as Wundt and Bain were defending
it.

Within this controversy James takes the presence of a feeling of ef'fort

(and nothing else) as the final determinant of the argwnent, and 'yet when he
discusses the will's freedom it is not enough.

There seems to be a real incon.''1),

siatency in the use of methodology here.
Furthermore, in calling into question the probative force of the conscious

I

,j:

:.i'i

:

awareness of his own acts, James is denying himself' the only real criterion
possible for substantiating anything about man.

There may be eight or ten (or

10,000) possible explanations for each of the psychic occurances within man,

.

,<•

"

but each is consciously experienced fundamentally in only one way by all men.
To demand more than this experience

r or verification

of an expla.n&tion is to

'.

deny oneself the possibility of affirming anything definite about man and the
",

'~

nature of his operations.

!,

Yet, a word in James' defense should be inserted here.

In man's conscious

experience he otten cannot tell whether a recent action 18 the result of a tree
choice on his part or the pull of interest inherent in the object of the action.
Or, as expressed above, whether the "live" TV camera is manned by a cameraman
or pulled here and there b.1 scenes and objects naturally photogenic?

Since

there are times that conscious experience really cannot settle a problem for
man--and the ,moment of human decision is one-..perhaps James was not so far
in refusing to apply it to the problem

or

orr

freedom.

It must be added, however, that following the Jamesian manner of considerL
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iug the will in a wider context, man

~

have power over and is responsible

f or his wider context of interests.

By a series of single acts, which may or

may not be free, he can strive for a basic goal or orientation within himself.
The more he orders all his single actions to the realization of this goal, the

... ;

1

....",

."

,
. !

1 ,

.
....

:.;; ,
..,

·

~'

sooner he will become and be that which he wishes to be. Man is free fundamen-

'

.......

tally to become internally what he desires.
experienced by all men.

This freedom in a larger sense is

James himself utilized it when he decided to struggle

"

..... 1

against his neurasthenia and to "become and be" an active man.
A plausible explanation for the evident

volte-~

within the Principles,

.1:

I

:.11

I

..

"I'

James I refusal to use conscious experience at one time after having used it
earlier, lies in the fact that he considered freedom predominantly as a philosophical problem, wherein criteria for psychological proof would not suffice.

\; 'I
...1 (,

On the other ham, the "feeling of irmervation" theory was probably never considered by him except in the context of psychology and its criteria for verification.

This explanation brings to the fore the strange blend of philosophy

and psychology within the Principles, a secood weakness of this work and one
involving will-cloctrine itself and its 1.lIplications tor tr••dca.
Although in the Principles James trequently asserts his bellef in treedOll
and the gospel of effort, the general result of the psychology
therein exposed is strangely close to automatism.
supplies the

~-determ1nation

or

the will

Ideo-motor action, which

of a particular idea of action, is almost

pletely an automatic operation.

COlll-

No sooner are afferent nerve impulses relayed

to the brain,. then, if the idea is clearly attended to, they are issued forth
as efferent impulses to the muscle cells.
by consent, the ideal 8 filline up

or

The

the mind.

~-determination

is supplied

Granted that Jwnes never states

.'
·1

,,'. .
.
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clearly what brings about consent, whether a quality inherent in the idea
(determinism) or in the subject himself (freedom).

II

.

~,.

The general impression

,;

created by an idea's filling up of the mind, however, is one of man helplessl,
urged and checked b.1 the power of ideas in full possession of his consciousness.

-

•

.

j~

....- .
•

'

James' strong assertion of belief in freedom seems rather weak in the face

...

,

of the implications consistentl7 flowing frem the various aspects of his will-

theory of automatism.

His psychology seems to clash with his philosophy (and
"1

•

within the same work), yet James never felt called upon to resolve the clash
or remove the

philosop~.

In writing the PrinCiples he strove to avoid labora-

tory psychology; he hoped to put in its place one teeming with the immediac1

or

everyday experience, a psychology that would be empirical and yet of interest
to the "intelligent layman. n

The result of this is that James dabbled in phil-

osophy as he wrote psychology.
Though there was a clash of doctrine concerning the vUl's freedom, James
allowed it to stand.

He refused to accept as evidence for a further question

what he arrived at as a psychologist.

He could see no other methodology, no

other level of explanation, than that which he used as a psychologist; thus, at
the completion of his empirical study'

or

the will, he merel7 asserted his phU-

osophical preferences for freedom and pushed on.

Having observed these wealc-

nesses in James' discussion of freedom within the Principles--the use and nonuse of conscious experience as a criterion, and the strange conflicting blend
of psychology and philosophy--Iet us go to the second part of our observations
on James' treatment of freedom, those concerning his will to believe methodology.
The will to believe is but one of two methods that James used as a philosopher; it is the tender-minded arm of his pragmatic method.

His tout>h-m1ndef!

i

,

• •

,: l'

'be"

)[i

'rae

T

.,

"tntW'

.. .
,

~"
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pragmatism flows from the phenomenalism that served him well as an empirical.
psychologist.

...

....

• '1:

But, within certain areas of phUosophy--those furthest fran

empirical verification--this phenomenalism narrows the limits of certainty
almost to nil; therefore, the only way to settle matters is by means of a will

: ;. . ~

...

.

..

i

... ~

decision, by belief •

I

,

James the scientist seamed unusually disturbed at the presence of the
subject to his own thought.

He felt that there are but two ways of resolving

a problem, the objective, verifiable, scientific method and the subjective,
willful, second-best method, utilized only because it shows results.

I

Tha sci-

.j'

..

i'l

entist, the philosopher must handle what problems be can with the scientific
method, radical empiricism, James' tough-minded pragmatism.

But, sad to say,

there are some problems that cannot be subjected to this D3thod.

Insufficient

evidence, the presence of the subject to the matter at hand, the impossibility

I

. '~

.

'" ,

..:;,

"

of empirical verifioation, invalidate a rational handling of the situation.
It is for this type of problem that James' tender-minded pragmatism, hiB will
to believe, seemed so sucoessful.
The question that seems worth raising here is whether these are the only
two alternatives open to the dedicated philosopher, radical empiricism or willful belief.

James' convictioll8 concerning the presence

or

ject to his philosophical reasonings are certainly cogent.
that individual aspects
knowing.

or

the individual subIt JIlust be admitted

personal attention truly structure much of man's

They influence the selection of data to be considered and thus the

very act of understanding itself J furthezmore, they have a say in what is to be
considered just verification.
much of his thought.

The subject is certainly very much present to

But, one is driven further to ask, i8 it right to assume

.

'I

i
1,

\'

~..

I
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that those areas where James awlied the will to believe 8Z'S so subject-laden
that the individual philosopher can only" resort to a willful decision to be-

,j

lieve?
Herein lies a real problem with James' will to believe methodology. Be-

.,
:

.~

'. I

...

llef in a view or reality that can lend meaning to one's future actions is
clearly desirable (James always demanded that that belief tit into the mesh
truths that

~

,

,~

or

empirically verified), but is the philosopher so easily to give

;,

..,.. ,
"II

"1

i

i

~ II

up the hope of attaining some rational philosophical method that will methodi-

il
,

cally produce truths that are absolute and objective?

In fact, does not the

presence of a further question, atter some empirical truths have been arrived
at, plead for the existence

I

,

I:

,: i

" Il

or a further methodology to handle that question?

To resort to the will is to kill or ignore the question.

It seems that there

~

I

are more tools available to the philosopher than the two that James considered)
and the ceaseless striving to answer further Q.uestions b7 Mans of a distinc-

tively philosophical method is more Jamesian than James hiluelt.
One final reservation must be mentioned with regard to James' will to be-

.~

: ~ , II

"f

lieve.

Pointed out to James by Al-thur O. Lovejoy) and cle8Z'ly explained more

recently by Paul Henle or the University of Michigan,4 it concerns the will to
believe as a theory

or

meaning.

To take the example of belief in God, James affirms, according to the will
to believe, that it this belief arfects a person's emotional outlook and mode

3Cf. Perry, vol. II, pp. 480-485.

4In his introductory essay to the James selections
American Philosophers,

~.

Cit., pp. 115-121.

in Max H. t'uch, Classic

i

I'
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of action then there is meaning present.

bare statement "God exists" come frC1l4?
itself before it can be believed.

But lihere does the meaning of the
This statement must have meaning in

James says that the neaning comes from the

very believing of it; but, this is impossible since then one would believe in
something that has no meaning in itsell.

The statement cannot have meaning

according to James' tough-minded pragmatic method either, since there is no
possible experimental test f or the existence of God.
According to James then a statement is maningtul i t it has experimental
consequences (tough-minded radical empiricism), or if in itself it has no such
consequences but believing it has experimental. consequences (tender-minded will
to believe).

In the first case the experimental consequences constitute the

meaning, but in the second case there is
meaning.

~

explanation of what constitutes the

James merely says that it it "makes a difference" to the individual

believer, there is meaning present.
That James was aware of this difficulty we have proof from a letter to
Professor Lovejoy dated September 13, 1907.
• • • when it comes to your distinction between two meanings • • • I have
to frankly cry peccavi--you convict me of real sin. Consequences of true
ideas per se, and consequences of ideas ~ believed bY us, are logicallJ
different consequences, and the whole "wrIl to beiiev6t ousiness has got
to be re-edited wi. th explicit uses made of the distinction. I have been
careless here, and I hope that you • • • will spread out that matter at
the lengt~ it deserves. Failure to do it on my part has been a misdemeanor • • • •
James never had the time or interest to get to that lire-editing" and as a
result there is a split down the middle of the whole of his philosophy.

'Perry, vol. II, p. 481.
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On the tender-minded side there are the will to believe, James' cosmology,
and his philosophy of religion.

10.,

On the tough-minded side we find radical em-

piricism, James' theory of truth, and his psychological writings.

His ethical

doctrine seems to embody parts of both theories of meaning. The two complement

·

,

'j

...4·;

each other in his mind, but nevertheless there are two theories of meaning, two
,

philosophies of William James.
Within this thesis we have progressed from a consideration of James' gen-

"'I
'"
"!

1• 1.

eral philosophic view of life, to his refusal to handle the question of freedom
as a psychologist and his solution of the problem as a moral philosopher, to
these closing remarks concerning the methodology he employed throughout.

It is

hoped that this exposition of what he said of human freedom and the way that
•
,j

~e

arrived at it will shed some small light upon the human condition, today

",
~I

when one third of all mankind is laboring under the bonds of some sort of

..

r

slavery.

~

I

,
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